Lay politics lies at the heart of democracy. Political offices are the only offices for which no formal qualifications are required. Contemporary political practices are diametrically opposed to this constitutional ideal. Most contemporary democracies in Western Europe are diploma democracies—ruled by those with the highest formal qualifications. Citizens with low or medium educational qualification levels currently make up about 70 per cent of the electorates, yet they have become virtually absent from almost all political arenas. University graduates have come to dominate all relevant political institutions and venues, from political parties, parliaments and cabinets, to organized interests, deliberative settings, and internet consultations. This rise of a political meritocracy is part of larger trend. In the information society, educational background, like class, or religion, is an important source of social and political divides. Those who are well educated tend to be cosmopolitans, whereas the lesser educated citizens are more likely to be nationalists. This book documents the context, contours, and consequences of this rise of a political meritocracy. It explores the domination of higher educated citizens in political participation, civil society, and political office in Western Europe. It discusses the consequences of this rise of political meritocracy, such as descriptive deficits, policy incongruences, biased standards, and cynicism and distrust. Also, it looks at ways to remedy, or at least mitigate, some of the negative effects of diploma democracy.

The Netherlands has always been the odd case out regarding trust in public institutions. In the 1980s and 1990s, contrary to international trends, trust in government remained high and even increased. Suddenly, from 2002 onwards, public trust in government declined dramatically. In this article we examine the plausibility of ten explanations, embedded in the international scholarly literature, and explore whether they are empirically supported or rebutted in case of the Dutch drop. We find that because most of the literature concentrates on the crossnational erosion of political support over a long period within Western democracies, explanations tend to focus on gradual, long-term demographic, social, and political trends. Sudden dips in trust levels, however, require different sets of explanatory factors; they are better explained by political or economic contingencies, such as sudden political or economic crises. In the case of the Dutch drop, the most plausible explanation is a combination of an economic decline, combined with high political instability and contestation during the first Balkenende cabinets. As of 2007, with a new cabinet in office, and an economic recovery in place, trust figures are on the rise again.

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This paper reports the results of a comprehensive, qualitative (100 interviews; 9 interactive workshops) study among Dutch ministers and top departmental officials.Its key question is how both groups conceive of their respective roles and working relationships. This question became a high-profile issue in the late 1990s after a series of overt clashes between senior political and bureaucratic executives. To what extent does the old, Weberian set of norms and expectations concerning the interaction between politics and bureaucracy still govern the theories and interaction patterns in use among ministers and top officials within the core executive? What new role conceptions are in evidence, and how can we explain their occurrence and diffusion in the Dutch core executive?