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Research in the field of metacognition, a multifaceted phenomenon, is in the main fragmented without much theoretical integration of the findings related to its various facets. Moreover, metacognition is usually conceived of as an individual and conscious process that serves the regulation of cognition. However, there is growing evidence that metacognition also functions at a nonconscious level, is involved in the co-regulation of cognition in collaborative settings, and interacts with affect in the self-regulation of behavior. Based on these considerations, a multifaceted and multilevel model of metacognition is proposed that broadens Nelson and Naren’s conceptualization of metacognition. The implications for theory and measurement of metacognition as well as for interventions involving metacognition are explored.

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Abstract. This article brings to the fore the sociocognitive aspect of metacognition and processes involved in coregulation. We argue that coregulation in a learning situation that involves the interaction of teachers and students or peers is based on awareness of the partners' cognition, metacognition, affect, and motivation, as well as interpersonal perception processes and/or interpersonal relational control processes. One aspect of metacognition, particularly relevant to coregulation of learning, is metacognitive experience, i.e., how the interacting partners feel and what they think about the task at hand. Awareness of one's own and the other's cognition and of metacognitive experiences is necessary for metacommunication control processes. Evidence from two independent studies suggests that there can be misperception of the interacting partners' metacognitive experiences because of “theory-driven” conceptions of the other person or lack of metacognitive coregulation because of the prevalence of relational control processes. We suggest that this may lead to scaffolding mismatch in instruction, failure in coregulation, and negative feelings and behaviors of the interacting partners in certain learning situations.

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INTRODUCTIONThis chapter focuses on metacognition and one particular aspect of it, namely, metacognitive experiences (ME). A question that immediately comes to mind is why metacognition, which is a cognitive phenomenon, is included in a book on motivation. First of all, the functional approach to motivation, which is basic in this book, requires the study of the interaction of motivation with cognition. Sorrentino and Higgins (1986) were pioneers in this approach, which gave significant insights in motivational research. However, cognition may take various forms and cannot be fully understood unless metacognition is taken into consideration. Metacognition has to do with awareness of cognition, that is, what we know about cognition, and is closely tied to consciousness and self-regulation. The question is if metacognition forms part of the mechanism that explains the operation of motivation and selfregulation, and if yes, what it accomplishes.One way of introducing metacognition into motivational research and theory is to ask if metacognition, as a dependent variable, is affected by motivational variables besides the cognitive ones, and, secondly, if metacognition, as independent variable, effects behavior and even one's affect. In the latter case, metacognition assumes motivational and/or self-regulatory power. In what follows, we shall provide evidence to support this double nature of metacognition, based on studies carried out in the School of Psychology at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece. We shall argue that metacognition, in the form of metacognitive experi- 297A.

This study aimed at delimiting possible relations of feeling of difficulty (FOD) with control ideas pertaining to a particular task. Participants were 274 students of 7th, 8th, and 9th grade. They were tested with two mathematical tasks; they were also asked to give ratings of the feeling of difficulty at 4 phases: In advance of problem solving, during planning of the solution, after solution production, and an overall estimation. Participants also gave ratings for control ideas such as need to know the rule, to do the computations right, to have practice, to use one's thinking and to have help from others. Path analysis and ANOVAs were used for the identification of the relations and differentiations of ratings in the four phases ofproblem solving. Results indicated that FOD varied from phase to phase and influenced ideas related to control. Feeling of difficulty in the main was only indirectly related to performance via control ideas.