This article reexamines the argument that targeted programs increase pro-incumbent voting

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. The University of Chicago Press and Southern Political Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Politics.Retrospective voting models assume that offering more information to voters about their incumbents' performance strengthens electoral accountability. However, it is unclear whether incumbent corruption information translates into higher political participation and increased support for challengers. We provide experimental evidence that such information not only decreases incumbent party support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout and support for the challenger party, as well as erodes partisan attachments. While information clearly is necessary to improve accountability, corruption information is not sufficient because voters may respond to it by withdrawing from the political process. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for studies of voting behavior.

This article asks whether religion undermines the negative relationship between income and left voting that is assumed in standard political economy models of democracy. Analysis of cross-country survey data reveals that this correlation disappears among religious individuals in countries that use proportional representation. This is the case in large part because there is a moral values dimension that has a correlation with income that is equal in magnitude but has the opposite sign as the economic dimension, and the votes of the religious are better explained by their positions on moral than economic issues, especially in countries with multiparty systems. The authors conclude by discussing implications for theories of redistribution.

This article considers the hypothesis that media-driven political interest shapes party identification, the timing of vote decisions, and electoral participation. To estimate the effect of media-driven political interest, we make a key distinction between political interest as a lifetime political orientation and political interest that rises and falls with the occurrence of noteworthy political events. We then exploit the shared media markets in Switzerland and its neighboring countries to overcome the otherwise crippling endogeneity problem and identify exogenous increases in Swiss citizens' self-reported political interest caused by the coverage of national elections in France, Germany, and Italy. We find that media-driven political interest increases the length of time individuals use to make their vote decisions, decreases partisanship, and increases self-reported and actual turnout.

Researchers conducting field experiments are sometimes faced with the challenge of analyzing field experiment results when the unit of assignment does not coincide with the unit of outcome measurement. For example, in electoral research, election results may be reported at a level of geography defined by electoral law, while the assignment of treatment can be made only at a level of geography different from this. Using examples from field experiments conducted in Canada and Mexico, we describe this problem and its consequences for analysis and interpretation of field experiment data and results. We also offer a number of practical solutions analysts can employ when faced with non-overlapping units of assignment and outcome measure in field experiments.