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PurposeThe primary purpose of this paper is to test the prediction that overpricing drives merger waves.Design/methodology/approachThe authors supplement proxies of overpricing from the existing literature such as subsequent under‐performance, the form of consideration/financing and low Book‐to‐Market ratios with an approach based on analysts' earnings forecasts. The authors maintain that over‐pricing is associated with relatively optimistically biased forecasts and use a metric based on subsequent earnings disappointments to represent mispricing.FindingsIt is reported that acquirers in hot markets are overpriced relative to acquirers in cold markets on almost all measures of over‐pricing thus supporting the behavioural theory. However, having controlled for optimistically biased expectations the long‐run BHARs to acquisitions in hot markets exceed those of acquisitions made in cold markets. These results therefore support the neoclassical theory's contention that post‐acquisition returns in merger waves are better than the unobserved alternative without the acquisition. The authors infer that neither the neoclassical nor behavioural theory on its own can provide a complete description of merger waves.Originality/valueThe authors exploit earnings forecasts to establish evidence of overpricing in a manner that is novel to the M&A literature. It is found that financing/consideration is significant in explaining subsequent under‐performance only in hot markets. This result is unaffected by controls for mispricing. The authors infer that the use of equity financing is driven by both behavioural timing and also by a desire to share any shortfall due to the increased potential for overpayment in hot markets.

Purpose – Researchers suspect that the overvaluation of equity issuing acquirers is a major cause of their subsequent post-event underperformance. Definitive conclusions regarding this overpricing hypothesis have not been possible since indicators of overpricing such as the book-to-market ratio and subsequent underperformance are open to alternative interpretations. The purpose of this paper is to corroborate or refute overvaluation as a driver of equity issuing acquirers’ subsequent underperformance. Design/methodology/approach – The literature has linked overvaluation of acquirers to over-optimistic expectations. The authors use analysts’ earnings forecasts to reflect the market's expectations. Over-optimism is indicated by subsequent earnings disappointments. The authors examine the relation between acquirers’ choice of payment method and their tendency to report disappointing earnings. The authors also examine the effect of including a more direct measure of over-optimism in a model to explain the long-run post-event buy-and-hold-abnormal returns of acquirers. Findings – The post-acquisition earnings of equity issuing acquirers disappoint more often than those of acquirers employing alternative financing methods. This relationship is confined to glamour acquirers. The ability of financing method to predict long-run post-acquisition performance is subsumed when direct measures of optimism are included in a model explaining long-run post-acquisition performance. This result is robust to controls for overpayment and other potential explanations of post-acquisition underperformance. Research limitations/implications – Acquirers’ management exploit their information advantage to exchange overvalued equity for the assets of the target company in accordance with Loughran and Ritter's (2000) behavioural timing hypothesis. Originality/value – The study provides new and unambiguous evidence that equity-issuing acquirers are optimistically priced at the time of acquisition.