How effective are effort targets? This paper provides novel evidence on the effects of job search requirements on effort provision and labor market outcomes. Based on large-scale register data, we estimate the returns to required job search effort, instrumenting individual requirements with caseworker stringency. Identification is ensured by the conditional random assignment of job seekers to caseworkers. We find that the duration of un-and non-employment both decrease by 3% if the requirement increases by one monthly application. When instrumenting actual applications with caseworker stringency, an additionally provided monthly application decreases the length of spells by 4%. In line with theory, we further find that the effect of required effort decreases in the individual's voluntary effort. Finally, the requirement level causes small negative effects on job stability, reducing the duration of re-employment spells by 0.3% per required application. We find a zero effect on re-employment wages. JEL-Codes: J640, J650.
Caseworkers are the main human resources used to provide social services. This paper asks if, and how much, caseworkers matter for the outcomes of unemployed individuals. Using largescale administrative data, I exploit exogenous variation in unplanned absences among Swiss UI caseworkers. I find that individuals who lose a meeting with their caseworker stay unemployed 5% longer. Results show large heterogeneity in the personal impact of caseworkers: the effect of a foregone meeting is zero for caseworkers in the lower half of the productivity distribution, while it amounts to more than twice the average effect for caseworkers in the upper half.
This paper studies how the potential duration of unemployment benefits affects individuals' job search behavior and re-employment outcomes. We exploit an unexpected reform of the German unemployment insurance scheme in 2008, which increased the potential benefit duration from 12 to 15 months for recipients of age 50 to 54. Based on detailed survey data and difference-indifferences techniques, we estimate that one additional month of benefits reduces the number of filed applications by around 10% on average over the first two months of unemployment. Treatment effects on the reservation wage are positive but statistically insignificant. In a complementary analysis, we use social security data to investigate how the reform affected reemployment outcomes. The difference-in-differences estimates yield an elasticity of 0.24 (0.1) additional months in unemployment (nonemployment) per additional month of potential benefits. A cautious back-of-the-envelope calculation reveals substantial returns to early search effort.
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This paper analyzes how subjective expectations about wage opportunities influence the job search decision. We match data on subjective wage expectations with administrative employment records. The data reveal that unemployed individuals over-estimate their future net re-employment wage by 10% on average. In particular, the average individual does not anticipate that wage offers decline in value with their elapsed time out of employment. How does this optimism affect job finding? We analyze this question using a structural job search framework in which subjective expectations about future wage offers are not constrained to be consistent with reality. Results show that wage optimism has highly dynamic effects: upon unemployment entry, optimism decreases job finding by about 8%. This effect weakens over the unemployment spell and eventually switches sign after about 8 months of unemployment. From then onward, optimism prevents unemployed individuals from becoming discouraged and thus increases search. On average, optimism increases the duration of unemployment by about 6.5%.
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