The aim of this paper is to present an overview of the pragmatic aspects of ambiguity present in deontic sentences, which may have three pragmatic functions: a prescriptive or a descriptive or a constitutive function. This type of ambiguity is investigated on the lexical, phrasal, and sentential level. The discussion focuses on the deontic constructions of the German verb sollen and the English shall as they are used in legal texts. It also includes comments on the thetic function of the Latin imperative mood and the subjunctive mood.
There are two analogies which justify the comparison between law and game. The notion of constitutive rule occurs in the formulation of both analogies. The paper L'enjeu des règles is devoted to the explication and the implications of the notion of eidetic- constitutive rule. The six main topics dealt with in the paper are : (i) history of the theory of constitutive rules ; (ii) definitions of the notion of eidetic-constitutive rule ; (iii) typology of deontic eidetic-contitutive rules (paradigmatic rules vs. syntagmatic rules) ; (iv) distinction between the notion of eidetic-constitutive rule and the related notion of anankastic-constitutive rule ; (v) discussion of the possibility of antinomies (conflicts) between eidetic-constitutive rules and between anankastic- constitutive rules ; (vi) analysis of the relevance of the theory of eidetic-constitutive rules for deontics, philosophy of law, philosophy of normative language.
H a6rfi cpboiq 67b pEv OKOTO<, brb 68 cpSq Eoriv. The same nature is sometimes darkness, and sometimes light. AristotleAbstract. The starting point of deontic logic is the distinction between non-normative necessity and normative necessity. The first part of the paper shows that the distinction between normative necessity and non-normative necessity occurs already in Aristotle's Orgunon. The second part of the paper makes a further distinction within normative deon itself: The distinction between deontic deon and anankastic deon. Anankastic deon behaves differently from deontic deon in a very important respect: Deontic indifference has no anankastic counterpart. I. Deon in Aristotle: Normative Deon vs. Non-Normative Deon 1.The starting point of deontic logic is the distinction between non-normative necessity and normative necessity.(i) Nun-normative necessity (and the related non-normative modal concepts:non-normative possibility, non-normative impossibility, non-normative contingency, . . . ) is the subject-matter of the theory which has been called alethic logic; (ii) normafive necessity, i.e., obligation, duty (and the related normative modal concepts: permission, i.e., the normative counterpart of alethic possibility; prohibition, i.e., the normative counterpart of alethic impossibility; indifference [Greek: &6iacpopia, adiuphonu, Latin: indifferentia, German: Gleichgiiltigkeit], i.e., the nonnative counterpart of alethic contingency, . . . ), in its turn, is the subject-matter of the theory which has been called deontic logic (von Wright 1951a; 1951b) (in Swedish: deontisk logik; in Finnish: deonttinen logiikka) (von Wright 1964, 261).
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