People are particularly sensitive to injustice. Accordingly, deeper knowledge regarding the processes that underlie the perception of injustice, and the subsequent decisions to either punish transgressors or compensate victims, is of important social value. By combining a novel decision-making paradigm with functional neuroimaging, we identified specific brain networks that are involved with both the perception of, and response to, social injustice, with reward-related regions preferentially involved in punishment compared with compensation. Developing a computational model of punishment allowed for disentangling the neural mechanisms and psychological motives underlying decisions of whether to punish and, subsequently, of how severely to punish. Results show that the neural mechanisms underlying punishment differ depending on whether one is directly affected by the injustice, or whether one is a third-party observer of a violation occurring to another. Specifically, the anterior insula was involved in decisions to punish following harm, whereas, in third-party scenarios, we found amygdala activity associated with punishment severity. Additionally, we used a pharmacological intervention using oxytocin, and found that oxytocin influenced participants' fairness expectations, and in particular enhanced the frequency of low punishments. Together, these results not only provide more insight into the fundamental brain mechanisms underlying punishment and compensation, but also illustrate the importance of taking an explorative, multimethod approach when unraveling the complex components of everyday decision-making. The perception of injustice is a fundamental precursor to many disagreements, from small struggles at the dinner table to wasteful conflict between cultures and countries. Despite its clear importance, relatively little is known about how the brain processes these violations. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, we combine methods from neuroscience, psychology, and economics to explore the neurobiological mechanisms involved in both the perception of injustice as well as the punishment and compensation decisions that follow. Using a novel behavioral paradigm, we identified specific brain networks, developed a computational model of punishment, and found that administrating the neuropeptide oxytocin increases the administration of low punishments of norm violations in particular. Results provide valuable insights into the fundamental neurobiological mechanisms underlying social injustice.
No abstract
How do we decide to keep interacting (e.g., stay) with a social partner or to switch (e.g., leave) to another? This paper investigated the neural mechanisms of stay/leave decision-making. We hypothesized that these decisions fit within a framework of value-based decision-making, and explored four potential mechanisms underlying a hypothesized bias to stay. Twenty-six participants underwent functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) while completing social and nonsocial versions of a stay/leave decision-making task. On each trial, participants chose between four alternative options, after which they received a monetary reward. Crucially, in the social condition, reward magnitude was ostensibly determined by the generosity of social partners, whereas in the nonsocial condition, reward amounts were ostensibly determined in a preprogrammed manner. Results demonstrated that participants were more likely to stay with options of relatively high expected value, with these values updated through Reinforcement Learning mechanisms and represented neurally within ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Moreover, we demonstrated that greater brain activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex, caudate nucleus, and septo-hypothalamic regions for social versus nonsocial decisions to stay may underlie a bias towards staying with social partners in particular. These findings complement existing social psychological theories by investigating the neural mechanisms of actual stay/leave decisions. ARTICLE HISTORY
This study investigated whether deciding to either stay with or leave a social relationship partner, based on a sequence of collaborative social interactions, is impacted by (1) observed and (2) anticipated gains and losses associated with the collaboration; and, importantly, (3) whether these effects differ between social and nonsocial contexts. In the social context, participants played an iterated collaborative economic game in which they were dependent on the successes and failures of a game partner in order to increase their monetary payoff, and in which they were free to stop collaborating with this partner whenever they chose. In Study 1, we manipulated the actual success rate of partners, and demonstrated that participants decided to stay longer with 'better' partners. In Study 2, we induced prior expectations about specific partners, while keeping the objective performance of all partners equal, and found that participants decided to stay longer with partners whom they expected to be 'better' than others, irrespective of actual performance. Importantly, both Study 1 and 2 included a nonsocial control condition that was probabilistically identical to the social conditions. All findings were replicated in nonsocial context, but results demonstrated that the effect of prior beliefs on stay/leave decision-making was much less pronounced in a social than a nonsocial context.
No abstract
No abstract
No abstract
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.