Does knowledge of language consist of abstract principles, or is it fully embodied in the sensorimotor system? To address this question, we investigate the double identity of doubling (e.g., slaflaf, or generally, XX; where X stands for a phonological constituent). Across languages, doubling is known to elicit conflicting preferences at different levels of linguistic analysis (phonology vs. morphology). Here, we show that these preferences are active in the brains of individual speakers, and they are demonstrably distinct from sensorimotor pressures. We first demonstrate that doubling in novel English words elicits divergent percepts: Viewed as meaningless (phonological) forms, doubling is disliked (e.g., slaflaf < slafmak), but once doubling in form is systematically linked to meaning (e.g., slaf = ball, slaflaf = balls), the doubling aversion shifts into a reliable (morphological) preference. We next show that sign-naive speakers spontaneously project these principles to novel signs in American Sign Language, and their capacity to do so depends on the structure of their spoken language (English vs. Hebrew). These results demonstrate that linguistic preferences doubly dissociate from sensorimotor demands: A single stimulus can elicit diverse percepts, yet these percepts are invariant across stimulus modality--for speech and signs. These conclusions are in line with the possibility that some linguistic principles are abstract, and they apply broadly across language modality.language universals | embodiment | phonology | morphology | sign language A cross languages, certain linguistic patterns are systematically preferred to others. English, for instance, allows pots and pans but not boxs and buss (from box and bus). Indeed, boxs and buss doubly engage the tongue blade, and doubling, generally, XX (where X stands for a phonological constituent) is avoided in the sound patterns of many languages (1, 2). Such (statistical) language universals are well documented (2). Their basis, however, is controversial.One possibility is that language universals reflect abstract linguistic principles that are shared across languages (3). Alternatively, the restrictions on language structure could be fully embodied in the sensory and motor pressures on speech perception and production (4). The former "abstraction hypothesis" states that forms like boxs are banned because they violate abstract linguistic principles, whereas the alternative "embodiment hypothesis" asserts that boxs is avoided because it is difficult to perceive and articulate.We note that these two alternatives represent extreme positions. And indeed, abstraction and embodiment could each play (distinct) roles at different components of the language system. For the sake of clarity, here, we deliberately focus on two extreme views that, by definition, are mutually exclusive, but we note that some forms of abstraction and embodiment could well coexist-a possibility we revisit in the General Discussion.These rival hypotheses generate conflicting predictions concerning...
Productivity—the hallmark of linguistic competence—is typically attributed to algebraic rules that support broad generalizations. Past research on spoken language has documented such generalizations in both adults and infants. But whether algebraic rules form part of the linguistic competence of signers remains unknown. To address this question, here we gauge the generalization afforded by American Sign Language (ASL). As a case study, we examine reduplication (X→XX)—a rule that, inter alia, generates ASL nouns from verbs. If signers encode this rule, then they should freely extend it to novel syllables, including ones with features that are unattested in ASL. And since reduplicated disyllables are preferred in ASL, such a rule should favor novel reduplicated signs. Novel reduplicated signs should thus be preferred to nonreduplicative controls (in rating), and consequently, such stimuli should also be harder to classify as nonsigns (in the lexical decision task). The results of four experiments support this prediction. These findings suggest that the phonological knowledge of signers includes powerful algebraic rules. The convergence between these conclusions and previous evidence for phonological rules in spoken language suggests that the architecture of the phonological mind is partly amodal.
All spoken languages encode syllables and constrain their internal structure. But whether these restrictions concern the design of the language system, broadly, or speech, specifically, remains unknown. To address this question, here, we gauge the structure of signed syllables in American Sign Language (ASL). Like spoken languages, signed syllables must exhibit a single sonority/energy peak (i.e., movement). Four experiments examine whether this restriction is enforced by signers and nonsigners. We first show that Deaf ASL signers selectively apply sonority restrictions to syllables (but not morphemes) in novel ASL signs. We next examine whether this principle might further shape the representation of signed syllables by nonsigners. Absent any experience with ASL, nonsigners used movement to define syllable-like units. Moreover, the restriction on syllable structure constrained the capacity of nonsigners to learn from experience. Given brief practice that implicitly paired syllables with sonority peaks (i.e., movement)—a natural phonological constraint attested in every human language—nonsigners rapidly learned to selectively rely on movement to define syllables and they also learned to partly ignore it in the identification of morpheme-like units. Remarkably, nonsigners failed to learn an unnatural rule that defines syllables by handshape, suggesting they were unable to ignore movement in identifying syllables. These findings indicate that signed and spoken syllables are subject to a shared phonological restriction that constrains phonological learning in a new modality. These conclusions suggest the design of the phonological system is partly amodal.
All spoken languages encode syllables and constrain their internal structure. But whether these restrictions concern the design of the language system, broadly, or speech, specifically, remains unknown. To address this question, here, we gauge the structure of signed syllables in American Sign Language (ASL). Like spoken languages, signed syllables must exhibit a single sonority/energy peak (i.e., movement). Four experiments examine whether this restriction is enforced by signers and nonsigners. We first show that Deaf ASL signers selectively apply sonority restrictions to syllables (but not morphemes) in novel ASL signs. We next examine whether this principle might further shape the representation of signed syllables by nonsigners. Absent any experience with ASL, nonsigners used movement to define syllable-like units. Moreover, the restriction on syllable structure constrained the capacity of nonsigners to learn from experience. Given brief practice that implicitly paired syllables with sonority peaks (i.e., movement)-a natural phonological constraint attested in every human language-nonsigners rapidly learned to selectively rely on movement to define syllables and they also learned to partly ignore it in the identification of morpheme-like units. Remarkably, nonsigners failed to learn an unnatural rule that defines syllables by handshape, suggesting they were unable to ignore movement in identifying syllables. These findings indicate that signed and spoken syllables are subject to a shared phonological restriction that constrains phonological learning in a new modality. These conclusions suggest the design of the phonological system is partly amodal.
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