One key aspect of domain-general thought is the ability to integrate information across different cognitive domains. Here, we tested whether kea (Nestor notabilis) can use relative quantities when predicting sampling outcomes, and then integrate both physical information about the presence of a barrier, and social information about the biased sampling of an experimenter, into their predictions. Our results show that kea exhibit three signatures of statistical inference, and therefore can integrate knowledge across different cognitive domains to flexibly adjust their predictions of sampling events. This result provides evidence that true statistical inference is found outside of the great apes, and that aspects of domaingeneral thinking can convergently evolve in brains with a highly different structure from primates. This has important implications not only for our understanding of how intelligence evolves, but also for research focused on how to create artificial domain-general thought processes.

Contagious yawning has been suggested to be a potential signal of empathy in non-human animals. However, few studies have been able to robustly test this claim. Here, we ran a Bayesian multilevel reanalysis of six studies of contagious yawning in dogs. This provided robust support for claims that contagious yawning is present in dogs, but found no evidence that dogs display either a familiarity or gender bias in contagious yawning, two predictions made by the contagious yawning–empathy hypothesis. Furthermore, in an experiment testing the prosociality bias, a novel prediction of the contagious yawning–empathy hypothesis, dogs did not yawn more in response to a prosocial demonstrator than to an antisocial demonstrator. As such, these strands of evidence suggest that contagious yawning, although present in dogs, is not mediated by empathetic mechanisms. This calls into question claims that contagious yawning is a signal of empathy in mammals.

Prosocial behaviour is widespread in humans, but evidence for its occurrence in other species is mixed. We presented a parrot species, the kea (Nestor notabilis) with a series of experiments to test whether they exhibit prosocial tendencies. Across the first round of testing, in our first condition, two of the four kea acted prosocially, as they preferred to choose a prosocial token which rewarded both themselves and a partner, rather than a token that rewarded only themselves. Three of the four kea then showed a preference for the prosocial token in a second condition where they alternated taking turns with a partner. However, no kea showed a decrease in the third yoked control condition in which the experimenter replicated the token choice made by the partner in the previous alternating trials. This yoked condition was used to dissociate truly reciprocal behaviour, whereby the actor made choices based on their partner's choices, from a response to the amount of rewards conferred to the partner. Finally, three of the four kea continued to choose the prosocial token in the fourth asocial control condition where no partner was present. However, in round two of testing, one kea changed its token choices to a similar pattern to that expected if kea are prosocial, in that it preferred the prosocial token in the initial condition, showed a trend for the prosocial token when turns were alternated, but chose at chance in the yoked and asocial conditions. This study therefore found no evidence of spontaneous reciprocity in kea but further testing is required before we can conclude that kea are not capable of prosocial behaviour at all.

The ability to represent both the identity and trajectory of hidden objects underlies our capacity to reason about causal mechanisms. However, to date no studies have shown that non-human animals are capable of representing these two factors simultaneously. Here, we tested whether kea can represent out-of-sight object trajectories and identities by presenting subjects with three tasks, each of which involved tracking or predicting hand trajectories as they moved behind a screen. Taken together, our results suggest that kea have the capacity for mental simulation in complex tasks involving moving hidden objects.

Macphail famously criticized two foundational assumptions that underlie the evolutionary approach to comparative psychology: that there are differences in intelligence across species, and that intelligent behavior in animals is based on more than associative learning. Here, we provide evidence from recent work in avian cognition that supports both these assumptions: intelligence across species varies, and animals can perform intelligent behaviors that are not guided solely by associative learning mechanisms. Finally, we reflect on the limitations of comparative psychology that led to Macphail's claims and suggest strategies researchers can use to make more advances in the field.