The thesis advanced is that people remember nonsensical pictures much better if they comprehend what they are about. Two experiments supported this thesis. In the first, nonsensical "droodles" were studied by subjects with or without an accompanying verbal interpretation of the pictures. Free recall was much better for subjects receiving the interpretation during study. Also, a later recognition test showed that subjects receiving the interpretation rated as more similar to the original picture a distractor which was close to the prototype of the interpreted category. In Experiment II, subjects studied pairs of nonsensical pictures, with or without a linking interpretation provided. Subjects who heard a phrase identifying and interrelating the pictures of a pair showed greater associative recall and matching than subjects who received no interpretation. The results suggest that memory is aided whenever contextual cues arouse appropriate schemata into which the material to be learned can be fitted.The following experiments address the question of how people remember pictures. We may begin with the observation that pictures (drawings, diagrams, photographs) comprise a two-dimensional notational system which, like language, has both a "surface structure" (the medium) and a meaningful "deep structure" (the message). Like language, pictures have a terminal vocabulary (of strokes, shadings, etc.), sets of combination rules, often a referential field, and conventional rules for interpreting what a picture is about (see Gombrich, 1960; Goodman, 1968). Pictures, especially "realistic" ones, denote objects or scenes in a manner that parallels the symbolic way that words and sentences do. And just as language appears to be acquired as a perceptual-motor skill, so also does it appear that children learn the conventional rules for interpreting the notational symbolism of pictures. These rules guide our construction of what a picture is about-what conceptualizations it expresses or what objects it symbolizes. That we learn to interpret drawings is illustrated clearly by the difficulty novices have acquiring the symbolic system of their profession, such as ballet labanotation, musical scoring, molecular structure, etc.We are interested in memory for pictures. The hypothesis to be tested is that a major determinant of how well a person can remember a picture is whether or not he "understands" it at the time he studies it. If he comprehends the picture-achieves a compact interpretation of it-then he should remember it much better than if he fails to comprehend it. This hypothesis was suggested by the work of Bransford and Johnson (1972), Bransford and McCarrell (in press), and Doll and Lapinski (1974) on memory for linguistic material. Thev showed convincingly that a

Previous studies have recommended that multiple measures be employed concurrently to provide converging evidence regarding the presence of suspect effort during neuropsychological assessment. However, if the tests are highly correlated they do not represent independent sources of information. To date, no study has examined correspondence between effort tests. The present study assessed the relationships between eight measures which can be used to assess effort (Rey 15-item, Rey Dot Counting Test, Rey Word Recognition Test, RAVLT recognition trial, Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test effort equation, Digit Span, Warrington Recognition Memory Test-Words, and "b" Test) in a sample of 105 patients in litigation or attempting to obtain/maintain disability compensation and who displayed noncredible symptoms based on psychometric performance and behavioral criteria. Modest to moderate correlations were observed between test summary scores with only two measures sharing more than 50% score variance (Digit Span and Dot Counting). Moderate correlations were also observed between individual test scores reflecting indices of response time, free recall, recognition, and false positive errors, providing possible evidence that patients may use specific strategies when producing noncredible performances. Overall the results suggest that the use of these various tests generally provides nonredundant data regarding patient credibility in neuropsychological evaluations.

Anger has been at the center of religiopolitical conflicts and has been associated with well‐being. This study examined the role of Muslim anger in sociopolitical events perceived as a sacred violation. A Muslim sample (N = 151) identified adverse political events that have deeply affected them; and completed measures of anger, sacred violations, perceptions of injustice, and religiousness. Sacred violations and perceptions of injustice were associated with greater levels of anger, with sacred violations being the stronger predictor. Post hoc analyses revealed that surrender problem‐solving style increased anger control. The findings provide broad support for the importance of religious appraisals of adverse political events in Muslim anger.

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This essay will build on Emmanuel Levinas's rejection of ontology as foundational and draw out the implications for psychotherapy. We will explore Levinas's concept of substitution (in both his more Jewish writings and his philosophical treatises) and consider its meaning in relationship to the role of a psychotherapist. Levinas understands the Other as a calling for substitution of the self and of a taking on of responsibility. We explore the notion of surrender in the work of the psychoanalyst Emmanuel Ghent and argue that his position is ultimately lacking in ethical injunction; requiring nothing of the self in relationship to the Other. It remains within the confines of the conventional, self-reflexive models that Levinas critiques. Following Levinas, we suggest that the therapist bear the burden of ethical responsibility by being exposed to the client's ethical call and by responding out of a kenotic self-emptying."No one has greater love than this, to lay down one's life for one's friends." (John 15:13) Western Enlightenment models of therapy are continuous with Descartes' self-conscious ego, capable of positing itself, engaging in intentional action, and deciding how and when to relate to the other. This ego encounters the world, rationally orders it, thematizes it, making A. Dueck ( ) School of Psychology, Fuller Theological Seminary,