Work in progress; comments are most welcome. AbstractThis paper analyses the track record of fiscal forecasts reported by 15 European countries in the context of the Excessive Deficit Procedure. For the budget balance, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and interest payments, we study the statistical properties of forecast errors and their politico-institutional determinants. While errors in interest and GFCF expenditure present few systematic patterns, budget balance errors are responsive to fiscal institutions and to opportunistic motivations, especially from 1999 onwards: upcoming elections induce over-optimism, whereas commitment or mixed forms of fiscal governance and numerical expenditure rules (but not deficit and debt rules) are associated to greater prudence.JEL Classification: E62, H62, H68

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The impact of human and public capital on growth is a major issue in economic theory and in policy evaluation. Using a cointegrated VAR, we estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function for Portugal with public and human capital. Return rates are then computed with and without dynamic feedbacks. Without these, human capital yields a return comparable to private investment, and smaller than public investment. Considering dynamic feedbacks, private capital responds positively to a shock in public capital, but negatively to a shock in human capital. Consequently, the dynamic feedbacks return on human capital is much lower than on public capital.