Historically, the element of uncertainty in quantum mechanics has been expressed through mathematical identities called uncertainty relations, a great many of which continue to be discovered. These relations use diverse measures to quantify uncertainty (and joint uncertainty). In this paper we use operational information-theoretic principles to identify the common essence of all such measures, thereby defining measure-independent notions of uncertainty and joint uncertainty. We find that most existing entropic uncertainty relations use measures of joint uncertainty that yield themselves to a small class of operational interpretations. Our notion relaxes this restriction, revealing previously unexplored joint uncertainty measures. To illustrate the utility of our formalism, we derive an uncertainty relation based on one such new measure. We also use our formalism to gain insight into the conditions under which measure-independent uncertainty relations can be found.
Moving target defense (MTD) strategies have been widely studied for securing computer systems. We consider using MTD strategies to provide long-term cryptographic security for message transmission against an eavesdropping adversary who has access to a quantum computer. In such a setting, today’s widely used cryptographic systems including Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol and RSA cryptosystem will be insecure and alternative solutions are needed. We will use a physical assumption, existence of multiple communication paths between the sender and the receiver, as the basis of security, and propose a cryptographic system that uses this assumption and an MTD strategy to guarantee efficient long-term information theoretic security even when only a single path is not eavesdropped. Following the approach of Maleki et al., we model the system using a Markov chain, derive its transition probabilities, propose two security measures, and prove results that show how to calculate these measures using transition probabilities. We define two types of attackers that we call risk-taking and risk-averse and compute our proposed measures for the two types of adversaries for a concrete MTD strategy. We will use numerical analysis to study tradeoffs between system parameters, discuss our results, and propose directions for future research.
No abstract
Information theoretic secret key agreement is impossible without making initial assumptions. One type of initial assumption is correlated random variables that are generated by using a noisy channel that connects the terminals. Terminals use the correlated random variables and communication over a reliable public channel to arrive at a shared secret key. Previous channel models assume that each terminal either controls one input to the channel, or receives one output variable of the channel. In this paper, we propose a new channel model of transceivers where each terminal simultaneously controls an input variable and observes an output variable of the (noisy) channel. We give upper and lower bounds for the secret key capacity (i.e., highest achievable key rate) of this transceiver model, and prove the secret key capacity under the conditions that the public communication is noninteractive and input variables of the noisy channel are independent.
Secret key agreement (SKA) is an essential primitive in cryptography and information security. In a multiterminal key agreement problem, there are a set of terminals each having access to a component of vector random variable. The goal of the terminals is to establish a shared key among a designated subset of terminals. This problem has been studied under different assumptions about the adversary's information, the most general case corresponding to the setting where adversary's information is represented by a random variable that is correlated with all terminals' variables. Secret key capacity for this general adversary that is known as the wiretap adversary, is not known in the general case. In this paper, we calculate the wiretap secret key capacity of a Tree-PIN, and present a protocol that achieves this capacity for SKA among an arbitrary subset of terminals. We relate our work with known results and discuss future directions for research.
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