Conventional markets can underprovide ecosystem services. Deliberate creation of a market for ecosystem services [e.g., a payments for ecosystem services (PES) scheme] can close the gap. The new ecosystem service market alters behaviors and quantities of ecosystem service provided and reveals prices for the ecosystems service: a market-clearing equilibrium. Assessing the potential for PES programs, which often act as ecological infrastructure investment mechanisms, requires forecasting the market-clearing equilibrium. Forecasting the equilibrium is complicated, especially at relevant social and ecological scales. It requires greater disciplinary integration than valuing ecosystem services or computing the marginal cost of making a land-use change to produce a service. We conduct anex antebenefit–cost assessment and forecast market-clearing prices and quantities for ecological infrastructure investment contracts in the Panama Canal Watershed. The Panama Canal Authority could offer contracts to private farmers to change land use to increase dry-season water flow and reduce sedimentation. A feasible voluntary contracting system yields a small program of about 1,840 ha of land conversion in a 279,000-ha watershed and generates a 4.9 benefit–cost ratio. Physical and social constraints limit market supply and scalability. Service delays, caused by lags between the time payments must be made and the time services stemming from ecosystem change are realized, hinder program feasibility. Targeting opportunities raise the benefit–cost ratio but reduce the hectares likely to be converted. We compare and contrast our results with prior state-of-the-art assessments on this system.

Stated preference methods remain the only means capable of estimating non-use values yet can suffer from many types of well-known biases. We construct an approach to identify the role of social desirability bias, relative to other potential survey biases, using a stated preference survey for improving the status of species at risk. The survey respondents were asked how they would vote, how they think their fellow survey participants would vote, as well as how they think people in their region would vote in an actual referendum. We find that willingness-to-pay estimates for public good (passive use) values differ across these vote question types. Our results demonstrate how stated preference practitioners can use multiple referent groups to help disentangle social desirability bias from other survey biases.

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