This article analyses the impact of populist right-wing parties (PRWPs) on welfare state reforms in Western Europe in the light of the trade-off that they face between office and votes. On the one hand, PRWPs appeal to traditionally left-leaning blue-collar "insiders" supportive of social insurance schemes. On the other hand, they have only been able to take part in government as junior coalition partners with liberal or conservative parties who are more likely to retrench these very same welfare programs. In this context, the article argues that these parties have to choose between betraying their electorate (and losing votes), and betraying their coalition partners (and losing office). When they choose office, it enables welfare state retrenchment by allowing their coalition partners to curtail left-wing opposition, but entails high electoral costs for PRWPs. When they choose votes, it generates deadlock and potentially jeopardises their participation in government. The paper draws on a comparative analysis of pension reforms during three periods of government participation of PRWPs: the Schüssel I and II cabinets in Austria (2000Austria ( -2006, the Rutte I cabinet in the Netherlands (2010-2012) and three pension reforms in Switzerland between 1995 and 2010. The analysis draws on original primary material and interviews.

Because they are now members of most Western European parliaments, Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) have the potential to influence the formulation of socio-economic policies. However, scholarly attention so far has nearly exclusively focussed on the impact of PRRPs on what is considered their 'core issue', that is migration policy. In this paper, we provide the first mixed methods comparative study of the impact of PRRPs on redistributive and (de-)regulative economic policies. Combining quantitative data with qualitative case studies, our results show that the participation of PRRPs in right-wing governments has noteworthy implications for socio-economic policies. Due to the heterogeneous constituencies of PRRPs, these parties not only refrain from welfare state retrenchment but are also less inclined to engage in deregulation compared with right-wing governments without PRRP participation.

This article provides an overview of the literature connecting comparative political economy and international migration in advanced industrialised countries with a focus on the relationship between labour migration, labour markets and welfare institutions. Immigration flows and policies are considered both as independent (how migration shapes capitalist institutions) and dependent variables (how migration flows and policies are shaped by capitalist institutions). First, we discuss the impact of international migration on labour market institutions, welfare states and skill production regimes. Second, we discuss how labour market institutions and welfare arrangements shape migrant inflows and migration policies, notably via the structuration of interests of employers, organised labour and governments. We emphasise the ideas of liberalisation, segmentation, substitution and complementarity to grasp the relationship between immigration and labour market institutions.

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This paper shows how the rise of the Swiss People's Party (SVP) has affected welfare state reforms in Switzerland between the 1990s and the 2000s. In the 1990s, welfare state reforms drew on "modernizing" coalitions between FDP (Liberals), CVP (Christian Democrats) and SP (Social Democrats) combining retrenchment and "recalibration". In the 2000s the FDP and CVP increasingly sided with the SVP in right-wing coalitions pushing retrenchment alone. The article shows that changes in party competition have affected welfare schemes differently, with a policy gridlock in pension reforms, where voters of the SVP do not follow their elites, but unilateral retrenchment in unemployment insurance, where recipients can be portrayed as "underserving".

Alexandre Afonso is a teaching and research assistant at the Institute of Political and International Studies, University of Lausanne.

blogs.lse.ac.uk /impactofsocialsciences/2013/12/11/how-academia-resembles-a-drug-gang/ Academic systems rely on the existence of a supply of "outsiders" ready to forgo wages and employment security in exchange for the prospect of uncertain security, prestige, freedom and reasonably high salaries that tenured positions entail. Drawing on data from the US, Germany and the UK, Alexandre Afonso looks at how the academic job market is structured in many respects like a drug gang, with an expanding mass of outsiders and a shrinking core of insiders.