In the context of current scholarship concerned with facilitating integration between the biomedical and the patient-centred models of care, the article suggests that disease brings about an ontological disruption in patients, which is not directly addressed in either model, and may interfere with treatment and therapy outcomes if not met with a type of care termed here as 'metaphysical'. The receipt of diagnosis and medical care can give patients the sense that they are ontologically diminished, or less of a human, and along with physicians' approaches to and discourses about disease, may prompt them to seek ontological restoration or security in the same way as psychologically traumatized patients sometimes do: by treating the disease and/or the experience of harm associated with it as a thing that exists per se. I call this 'substantialization' of disease (or harm) and draw on Augustine's theory of non-substantial deficiencies (physiological and moral) and on Plato's and Plotinus's different takes on such defects in order to discuss what substantialization can do for patients. Based on literature that examines patients' ways of talking about and living with their disease, I speculate that substantialization can generate a 'hybrid symptom', consisting in patterns of exercising agency which may predispose to non-adherence. Ways in which physicians could provide metaphysical care are proposed, along with an understanding of chronic patients as hybrid ontological and agentic units, which draws on theories of enactive cognition. I opine that metaphysical care may facilitate integration between the depersonalized and personalized models of care.

Something important is happening in applied, interdisciplinary research, particularly in the field of applied health research. The vast array of papers in this edition are evidence of a broad change in thinking across an impressive range of practice and academic areas. The problems of complexity, the rise of chronic conditions, overdiagnosis, co-morbidity, and multi-morbidity are serious and challenging, but we are rising to that challenge. Key conceptions regarding science, evidence, disease, clinical judgement, and health and social care are being revised and their relationships reconsidered: Boundaries are indeed being redrawn; reasoning is being made "fit for practice." Ideas like "person-centred care" are no longer phrases with potential to be helpful in some yet-to-be-clarified way: Theorists and practitioners are working in collaboration to give them substantive import and application.

Ontology is involved in medical care, because what both doctors and patients think the disease, the patient and the doctor are affects the giving and receiving of care, and hence the definition of medical care as profession. Going back to ancient philosophical views of disease as 'bounded entity' or as 'relation' (still echoed in contemporary theories and mindsets), I propose a way to think ontologically about disease that places it in necessary connection with the patient as person. Drawing on Augustine's views on disease, bodily integrity, and the human person as mind-body unit, I speak of 'monistic dualism' as the view where the unit and health of the person is continuously and personally generated by the mind's attention to and action on the body, whether the body is impaired or not. Monistic dualism is identified as the ontological position of both patients who are (or can become) healthy within illness and clinicians who are 'healthy' in their profession. It is what guides both to create what their body is in a personal state of integrity or health. This 'metaphysical body' is termed 'the body electric' in patients, and I argue that clinicians can attend properly to the diseased body by attending to patients' metaphysical body. As clinicians offer metaphysical care to themselves, employing monistic dualism to create their metaphysical body, they should not deny it to patients. Ontology cannot be part of medical care without making metaphysical care a requirement.

The paper proposes that frameworks typical to metaphysics and art could be used in clinical treatment in somatic and psychiatric contexts to ensure improved care. The concept of the "body electric" of somatic patients which I introduced in previous work is developed further and paired with the "mind electric" of psychiatric patients. Both are defined as a patient's personally generated metaphysical possibility of being healthy-within-illness which is experientially actualized. Both concepts are used here to explore the alternative and the serious challenges to treatment approaches focused on clinical categories, disease, provision, and promotion of standardized or "black-box" therapies. An argument against the idea implied by the hope for such mass treatments and corresponding overreliance on science, namely, that health comes from fixing and regularizing, is developed based on cultural history and the evidenced fact that personally assumed health, just like art and metaphysics, is transgressive of scientific data, and accommodates the untrue, the impossible or the irregular as actual and normal. Because normality is created only with the help of disorder and from within it for chronic patients, clinicians should offer them the metaphysical care they need to produce and actualize their possibility of irregular normality or their body/mind electric. Better treatments can only be provided when scientific advances will be matched with advances in the humanistic competence of clinicians.