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Network infrastructure sharing and base station (BS) switching off mechanisms have been recently introduced as promising solutions towards energy and cost reduction in cellular networks.Although these techniques are usually studied independently, their combination offers new alternatives to mobile network operators (MNOs) for serving their users and could potentially provide them with additional benefits. In this article, we introduce the concept of intra-cell roamingbased infrastructure sharing, where the MNOs may switch off their BSs and roam their traffic to active BSs operated by other MNOs in the same cell. Motivated by the coexistence of multiple operators in the same area, we present possible network deployments and architectures in current and future cellular scenarios, discussing their particular characteristics. In addition, we propose an innovative distributed game theoretic BS switching off scheme, employing an integrated cost function that takes into account all the different cases for a given operator to serve its own traffic (i.e., through active BSs of neighboring cells or exploiting intra-cell roaming-based infrastructure sharing). Finally, we demonstrate some indicative simulation results in realistic scenarios to quantify the potential energy and financial benefits that our proposed scheme offers to the MNOs

Abstract-The introduction of 4th Generation (4G) wireless technologies has fueled the rapid development of cellular networks, significantly increasing the energy consumption and the expenditures of the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). In addition, the network underutilization during low traffic periods (e.g., night zone) has motivated a new business model, namely infrastructure sharing, that allows the MNOs to have their traffic served by other MNOs in the same geographic area, thus being able to switch off part of their network. In this paper, we propose a novel infrastructure sharing algorithm for multi-operator environments, which enables the deactivation of underutilized Base Stations (BSs) during low traffic periods. Motivated by the conflicting interests of the MNOs and the necessity for effective solutions, we introduce a game theoretic framework that enables the MNOs to individually estimate the switching off probabilities that reduce their expected financial cost. Our approach reaches a Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (DSE), which is the strategy that minimizes the cost of each player. Finally, we provide extensive analytical and experimental results to estimate the potential energy and cost savings that can be achieved in multi-operator environments, incentivizing the MNOs to apply the proposed scheme.

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