Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has revealed a set of regions selectively engaged in visual scene processing: the parahippocampal place area (PPA); the retrosplenial complex (RSC); and a region around the transverse occipital sulcus (previously known as “TOS”), here renamed the “occipital place area” (OPA). Are these regions not only preferentially activated by, but also causally involved in scene perception? Although past neuropsychological data imply a causal role in scene processing for PPA and RSC, no such evidence exists for OPA. Thus, to test the causal role of OPA in human adults, we delivered transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the right OPA (rOPA) or the nearby face-selective right occipital face area (rOFA) while participants performed fine-grained perceptual discrimination tasks on scenes or faces. TMS over rOPA impaired discrimination of scenes but not faces, while TMS over rOFA impaired discrimination of faces but not scenes. In a second experiment, we delivered TMS to rOPA, or the object-selective right lateral occipital complex (rLOC) while participants performed categorization tasks involving scenes and objects. TMS over rOPA impaired categorization accuracy of scenes but not objects, while TMS over rLOC impaired categorization accuracy of objects but not scenes. These findings provide the first evidence that OPA is causally involved in scene processing, and further show that this causal role is selective for scene perception. Our findings illuminate the functional architecture of the scene perception system, and also argue against the “distributed coding” view in which each category-selective region participates in the representation of all objects.

Communication requires the abilities to generate and interpret utterances and to infer the beliefs, desires, and goals of others (“Theory of Mind”; ToM). These two abilities have been shown to dissociate: individuals with aphasia retain the ability to think about others’ mental states; and individuals with autism are impaired in social reasoning, but their basic language processing is often intact. In line with this evidence from brain disorders, functional MRI (fMRI) studies have shown that linguistic and ToM abilities recruit distinct sets of brain regions. And yet, language is a social tool that allows us to share thoughts with one another. Thus, the language and ToM brain networks must share information despite being implemented in distinct neural circuits. Here, we investigated potential interactions between these networks during naturalistic cognition using functional correlations in fMRI. The networks were functionally defined in individual participants, in terms of preference for sentences over nonwords for language, and for belief inference over physical-event processing for ToM, with both a verbal and a nonverbal paradigm. Although, across experiments, interregion correlations within each network were higher than between-network correlations, we also observed above-baseline synchronization of blood oxygenation level-dependent signal fluctuations between the two networks during rest and story comprehension. This synchronization was functionally specific: neither network was synchronized with the executive control network (functionally defined in terms of preference for a harder over easier version of an executive task). Thus, coordination between the language and ToM networks appears to be an inherent and specific characteristic of their functional architecture. NEW & NOTEWORTHY Humans differ from nonhuman primates in their abilities to communicate linguistically and to infer others’ mental states. Although linguistic and social abilities appear to be interlinked onto- and phylogenetically, they are dissociated in the adult human brain. Yet successful communication requires language and social reasoning to work in concert. Using functional MRI, we show that language regions are synchronized with social regions during rest and language comprehension, pointing to a possible mechanism for internetwork interaction.

Language comprehension and the ability to infer others’ thoughts (theory of mind [ToM]) are interrelated during development and language use. However, neural evidence that bears on the relationship between language and ToM mechanisms is mixed. Although robust dissociations have been reported in brain disorders, brain activations for contrasts that target language and ToM bear similarities, and some have reported overlap. We take another look at the language-ToM relationship by evaluating the response of the language network, as measured with fMRI, to verbal and nonverbal ToM across 151 participants. Individual-participant analyses reveal that all core language regions respond more strongly when participants read vignettes about false beliefs compared to the control vignettes. However, we show that these differences are largely due to linguistic confounds, and no such effects appear in a nonverbal ToM task. These results argue against cognitive and neural overlap between language processing and ToM. In exploratory analyses, we find responses to social processing in the “periphery” of the language network—right-hemisphere homotopes of core language areas and areas in bilateral angular gyri—but these responses are not selectively ToM-related and may reflect general visual semantic processing.

Language and social cognition, especially the ability to reason about mental states, known as Theory of Mind (ToM), are deeply related in development and everyday use. However, whether these cognitive faculties rely on distinct, overlapping, or the same mechanisms remains debated. Some evidence suggests that, by adulthood, language and ToM draw on largely distinct—though plausibly interacting—cortical networks. However, the broad topography of these networks is similar, and some have emphasized the importance of social content / communicative intent in the linguistic signal for eliciting responses in the language areas. Here, we combine the power of individual-subjects functional localization with the naturalistic-cognition inter-subject correlation approach to illuminate the language-ToM relationship. Using fMRI, we recorded neural activity as participants (n = 43) listened to stories and dialogs with mental state content (+linguistic, +ToM), viewed silent animations and live action films with mental state content but no language (−linguistic, +ToM), or listened to an expository text (+linguistic, −ToM). The ToM network robustly tracked stimuli rich in mental state information regardless of whether mental states were conveyed linguistically or non-linguistically, while tracking a +linguistic/−ToM stimulus only weakly. In contrast, the language network tracked linguistic stimuli more strongly than a) non-linguistic stimuli, and than b) the ToM network, and showed reliable tracking even for the linguistic condition devoid of mental state content. These findings suggest that in spite of their indisputably close links, language and ToM dissociate robustly in their neural substrates—and thus plausibly cognitive mechanisms—including during the processing of rich naturalistic materials.