Background Sedation in palliative care is frequently but controversially discussed. Heterogeneous definitions and conceptual confusion have been cited as contributing to different problems 1) relevant to empirical research, for example, inconsistent data about practice, the ‘data problem’, and 2) relevant for an ethically legitimate characterisation of the practice, the ‘problem of ethical pre-emption’. However, little is known about how exactly definitions differ, how they cause confusion and how this can be overcome. Method Pre-explicative analyses: (A) systematic literature search for guidelines on sedation in palliative care and systematic decomposition of the definitions of the practice in these guidelines; (B) logical distinction of different ways through which the two problems reported might be caused by definitions; and (C) analysis of how content of the definitions contributes to the problems reported in these different ways. Results 29 guidelines from 14 countries were identified. Definitions differ significantly in both structure and content. We identified three ways in which definitions can cause the ‘data problem’ – 1) different definitions, 2) deviating implicit concepts, 3) disagreement about facts. We identified two ways to cause the problem of ethical pre-emption: 1) explicit or 2) implicit normativity. Decomposition of definitions linked to the distinguished ways of causing the conceptual problems shows how exactly single parts of definitions can cause the problems identified. Conclusion Current challenges concerning empirical research on sedation in palliative care can be remediated partly by improved definitions in the future, if content and structure of the used definitions is chosen systematically. In addition, future research should bear in mind that there are distinct purposes of definitions. Regarding the ‘data problem’, improving definitions is possible in terms of supplementary information, checking for implicit understanding, systematic choice of definitional elements. ‘Ethical pre-emption’, in contrast, is a pseudo problem if definitions and the relationship of definitions and norms of good practice are understood correctly.
Background: Terminology concerning sedation in palliative care is heterogeneous, vague, and difficult to apply with negative impact on the reliability of quantitative data, practice, and ethical discourse. Design: To clarify the concept, we systematically developed definitions of core terms in an interdisciplinary research group comprising palliative care, ethics, law, and philosophy, integrating feedback from external experts. Results: We define terms stepwise, separating matters of terminology (What is the practice?) from matters of good practice (How to use it?). We start with an operational definition of “reduced level of consciousness” (score < 0 on the Richmond Agitation-Sedation Scale modified for palliative care inpatients (RASS-PAL), followed by defining “sedating,” “sedation,” and “intentional sedation” as the result or process of sedating a patient as a means of achieving a previously defined treatment goal and the terms “light,” “deep,” “temporary,” and “sedation until death.” Conclusion: The terminology facilitates the precise phrasing of aims, indications, and rules for good practice. Empirical research on acceptance and feasibility is needed.
Researchers in applied ethics, and some areas of bioethics particularly, aim to develop concrete and appropriate recommendations for action in morally relevant real-world situations. When proceeding from more abstract levels of ethical reasoning to such concrete recommendations, however, even with regard to the very same normative principle or norm, it seems possible to develop divergent or even contradictory recommendations for action regarding a certain situation. This may give the impression that such recommendations would be arbitrary and, hence, not well justified. Against this background, we, first, aim at showing that ethical recommendations for action, although being contingent in some sense, are not arbitrary if developed appropriately. For this purpose, we examine two types of contingencies arising in applied ethics reasoning based on recent examples of recommendations for action in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In doing so, we refer to a three-step model of ethical reasoning towards recommendations for actions. This, however, leaves open the question of how applied ethics may cope with contingent recommendations for action. Therefore, in a second step, we analyze the role of bridge principles for developing ethically appropriate recommendations for action, i.e., principles which connect normative claims with relevant empirical information to justify certain recommendations for action in a given morally relevant situation. Finally, we discuss some implications for reasoning and reporting in empirically informed ethics.
Academic publications of empirical public health research often entail recommendations for moral action that address practitioners and policy makers. These recommendations are regularly based on implicit moral judgments with the underlying reasons not explicitly stated. In this paper, we elaborate on the moral relevance of such judgments and the need to explain them in order to account for academic argumentation. We argue for an explicit reporting of bridge principles to increase the transparency of the reporting of public health research. The reporting of bridge principles can inform readers, support them in understanding the relationship between empirical and normative claims in a specific paper, and may pave new ways for the rigorous reporting of empirical research that has moral implications. Furthermore, it can be used to classify studies to systematically address the justification for their argumentation.
This paper is a case study. After formulating three norms for critical assessment of argumentation (section 1), I give a brief overview of Galileo's argumentative strategy in his Dialogue and present his argument for the cause of the tides, which appears as an argument by analogy (section 2). I then discuss possible reconstructions of this argumentation, with one particular suggestion in detail. These arguments seem to fall short, given the aforementioned set of norms (section 3). This leads to my own proposal of Galileo's argument. I defend this proposal and it's general idea -that is, the argument's pattern. It will be classified as 'interventionist' and useful regarding the goals of critical assessment (section 4). Finally, I suggest that the pattern of argument is applicable to other cases and useful for applied theory of science (section 5).
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