The current U.S. income tax system subsidizes contributions to charities by allowing individual taxpayers to itemize and deduct contributions from taxable income. In effect, taxpayers can receive a rebate from the government based on the contributions they make to charitable organizations. Under one alternative system, the government matches the contributions of individual taxpayers at some rate between 0 percent and 100 percent. This paper explores the tax policy and administrative implications of matching rather than rebating contributions in a tax system with voluntary reporting. We conduct a novel experiment to examine both charitable giving and compliance behavior under the two regimes.

Endgame studies have long served as a tool for testing human creativity and intelligence. We find that they can serve as a tool for testing machine ability as well. Two of the leading chess engines, Stockfish and Leela Chess Zero (LCZero), employ significantly different methods during play. We use Plaskett’s Puzzle, a famous endgame study from the late 1970s, to compare the two engines. Our experiments show that Stockfish outperforms LCZero on the puzzle. We examine the algorithmic differences between the engines and use our observations as a basis for carefully interpreting the test results. Drawing inspiration from how humans solve chess problems, we ask whether machines can possess a form of imagination. On the theoretical side, we describe how Bellman’s equation may be applied to optimize the probability of winning. To conclude, we discuss the implications of our work on artificial intelligence (AI) and artificial general intelligence (AGI), suggesting possible avenues for future research.

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Tax audits are a necessary component of the tax system, but policymakers and others have expressed concerns about their potentially adverse real effects. Understanding the causal effects of tax audits has been hampered by lack of data and because typically tax audits are not randomly assigned. We use administrative data from random tax audits of small businesses to examine the real effects of being subject to a tax audit. We find that audited firms are more likely to go out of business following the audit. The effect is concentrated in firms that underreport their taxes, although we find some evidence that the administrative costs of an audit also negatively affect firm survival. Among firms that continue as going concerns, we find evidence that audits have adverse effects on future revenues but no effect on future wages, employment, or investment. Finally, we find that tax audits have side benefits, causing firms to make changes to improve their tax efficiency. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11142-022-09717-w.