We investigate a basic premise of prospect theory, that the valuation of gains and losses is separable. In prospect theory, gain-loss separability implies that a mixed gamble is valued by summing the valuations of the gain and loss portions of that gamble. Two experimental studies demonstrate a systematic violation of the double matching axiom, an axiom that is necessary for gain-loss separability. We document a reversal between preferences for mixed gambles and the associated gain and loss gambles-mixed gamble A is preferred to mixed gamble B, but the gain and loss portions of B are preferred to the gain and loss portions of A. The observed choice patterns are consistent with a process in which individuals are less sensitive to probability differences when choosing among mixed gambles than when choosing among either gain or loss gambles.

We investigate a basic premise of prospect theory, that the valuation of gains and losses is separable. In prospect theory, gain-loss separability implies that a mixed gamble is valued by summing the valuations of the gain and loss portions of that gamble. Two experimental studies demonstrate a systematic violation of the double matching axiom, an axiom that is necessary for gain-loss separability. We document a reversal between preferences for mixed gambles and the associated gain and loss gambles-mixed gamble A is preferred to mixed gamble B, but the gain and loss portions of B are preferred to the gain and loss portions of A. The observed choice patterns are consistent with a process in which individuals are less sensitive to probability differences when choosing among mixed gambles than when choosing among either gain or loss gambles.

In a large-scale field study of marathon runners, we test whether goals act as reference points in shaping the valuation of outcomes. Theories of reference-dependent preferences, such as Prospect Theory, imply that outcomes that are just below or just above a reference point are evaluated differently. Consistent with the Prospect Theory value function, we find that satisfaction as a function of relative performance (the difference between a runner's finishing time goal and her actual finishing time) exhibits loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity in both predictions of and actual experienced satisfaction. However, in contrast to Prospect Theory, we observe that loss aversion is partially driven by a discontinuity or jump at the reference point. In addition, we find that a runner's time goal as well as their previous marathon times simultaneously impact runner satisfaction, providing support for the impact of multiple reference points on satisfaction.

In a large-scale field study of marathon runners, we test whether goals act as reference points in shaping the valuation of outcomes. Theories of reference-dependent preferences, such as Prospect Theory, imply that outcomes that are just below or just above a reference point are evaluated differently. Consistent with the Prospect Theory value function, we find that satisfaction as a function of relative performance (the difference between a runner's finishing time goal and her actual finishing time) exhibits loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity in both predictions of and actual experienced satisfaction. However, in contrast to Prospect Theory, we observe that loss aversion is partially driven by a discontinuity or jump at the reference point. In addition, we find that a runner's time goal as well as their previous marathon times simultaneously impact runner satisfaction, providing support for the impact of multiple reference points on satisfaction.

While traditional economic models characterize individuals as boundlessly self‐interested, decades of empirical findings suggest that individuals' self‐interest motives are constrained by concurrent preferences for fairness. Individuals act on these preferences by behaving reciprocally: rewarding others perceived as behaving fairly and punishing others perceived as behaving unfairly. Successful firms must learn to navigate environments characterized by the reciprocity of their transaction partners. This paper investigates firms' judgments about employee reciprocity and posits a dysfunctional learning process whereby firms that overestimate employee reciprocity learn to correct their beliefs through feedback, while those that underestimate employee reciprocity do not. The result, demonstrated through computer simulation, is a systematic bias toward an overemphasis on employee self‐interest, and a resulting inefficiency in wage choices that hurts firm profitability. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.