In this article, we review the literature on interfirm contracting in an effort to synthesize existing research and direct future scholarship. While transaction cost economics (TCE) is the most prominent perspective informing the “optimal governance” and “safeguarding” function of contracts, our review indicates other perspectives are necessary to understand how contracts are structured: relational capabilities (i.e., building cooperation, creating trust), firm capabilities, relational contracts, and the real option value of a contract. Our review also indicates that contract research is moving away from a narrow focus on contract structure and its safeguarding function toward a broader focus that also highlights adaptation and coordination. We end by noting the following research gaps: consequences of contracting, specifically outcome assessment; strategic options, decision rights, and the evolution of dynamic capabilities; contextual constraints of relational capabilities; contextual constraints of contracting capabilities; complements, substitutes, and bundles; and contract structure and social process.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to fill the theoretical void in the discussion of effects of alliance portfolios on firm performance by studying the moderating role of a firm’s strategic positioning.
Design/methodology/approach
A fixed effects, autoregressive panel model on a comprehensive, longitudinal sample of large and medium-sized publicly traded companies in the USA.
Findings
The effect of alliance portfolios on firm performance is conditional on the firm’s strategic positioning.
Research limitations/implications
The results may not be applicable to firms outside the USA or small firms.
Practical implications
Executives should craft their alliance portfolios while considering the strategic positioning of their firms.
Originality/value
This paper presents the first study of alliance portfolios that uses a comprehensive, multi-industry sample while considering firms’ strategic positioning. The paper is the first to jointly study characteristics of alliance portfolios and firm strategies.
The goal of this paper is to connect managerial behavior on the ''agent-steward'' scale to managerial moral development and motivation. I introduce agent-and steward-like behavior: the former is selfserving while the latter is others-serving. I suggest that managerial moral development and motivation may be two of the factors that may predict the tendency of managers to behave in a self-serving way (like agents) or to serve the interests of the organization (like stewards). Managers at low levels of moral development are more likely to behave like agents, while managers at higher levels of moral development are more likely to behave like stewards. I also argue that managers at the highest level of moral development may serve the interests of people other than the firm's owners and thereby transfer wealth from the firm's owners to third parties. Moral motivation is likely to be a factor that moderates the proposed relationships. Finally, I develop propositions that address the role of material incentives in controlling behavior of managers at different levels of moral development.
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