Uric acid (UA) possesses free-radical-scavenging properties, and systemic administration is known to increase serum antioxidant capacity. However, it is not known whether this protects against oxidative stress. The effects of raising UA concentration were studied during acute aerobic physical exercise in healthy subjects, as a model of oxidative stress characterized by increased circulating 8-iso-prostaglandin F2alpha (8-iso-PGF2alpha) concentrations. Twenty healthy subjects were recruited to a randomized double-blind placebo-controlled crossover study, and underwent systemic administration of 0.5 g of UA in 250 ml of 0.1% lithium carbonate/4% dextrose vehicle or vehicle alone as control. Subjects performed high-intensity aerobic exercise for 20 min to induce oxidative stress. Plasma 8-iso-PGF2alpha concentrations were determined at baseline, after exercise and after recovery for 20 min. A single bout of high-intensity exercise caused a significant increase in plasma 8-iso-PGF2alpha concentrations from 35.0 +/- 4.7 pg/ml to 45.6 +/- 6.7 pg/ml (P<0.01). UA administration raised serum urate concentration from 293 +/- 16 to 487 +/- 16 micromol/l (P<0.001), accompanied by increased serum antioxidant capacity from 1786+/-39 to 1899 +/- 45 micromol/l (P<0.01). UA administration abolished the exercise-induced elevation of plasma 8-iso-PGF2alpha concentrations. High UA concentrations are associated with increased serum antioxidant capacity and reduced oxidative stress during acute physical exercise in healthy subjects. These findings indicate that the antioxidant properties of UA are of biological importance in vivo.

to leave the European Union (EU) caused a political earthquake in more ways than one. A profound sense of surprise or shock at the outcome of the vote was evident on all sides. Many had the sense of having woken up in a different country, one that had 'changed utterly' (Gormley-Heenan and Aughey, 2017). The choice for Brexit also set off a series of other dramatic events. The referendum as an event triggered the Brexit processor processes. During the first few months after the referendum, that process had already been punctuated by other surprising political moments and episodes in the United Kingdom, from the resignation of David Cameron as Prime Minister, by way of subsequent rivalrous infighting among Prime Ministerial pretenders and Theresa May's emergence unchallenged as Cameron's heir apparent. It also extended to the collapse of power-sharing in Northern Ireland and a strong snap election showing for Sinn Fein, to calls for a second referendum on Scottish independence (the first was held in 2014), and to May's switch from resolute determination not to cut and run electorally to her announcement on 18 April of a snap General Election for 8 June 2017. May justified this decision as necessary to give her a strong mandate to negotiate Brexit. Brexit presents new, daunting analytical tasks to social and political scientists. This Special Issue collects articles that contribute to completing these new tasks, across a range of domestic, comparative and international dimensions. We focus on three broad areas: the path that led to the referendum; explaining and interpreting the vote for Brexit; and assessing its consequences. The path to the referendum Why did the referendum occur and produce a choice for Brexit? Were the vote and decision to leave unnecessary and avoidable or, rather, almost inevitable, for example,

The British Conservative Party and the Spanish Partido Popular have been hostile, at least at times, to devolving greater power to regions. Although both parties might be expected to support decentralisation on economically liberal grounds, in fact both have found it extremely difficult to reconcile their centre-right economic instincts with a deeply ingrained commitment to the integrity of the state. This article explores the tension in conservative and liberal ideology between supporting sub-state political responsibility through decentralisation and supporting strong central government able to take long-term (and potentially unpopular) decisions in times of economic crisis. We examine these two parties in light of Toubeau and Wagner's (2015) framework, finding that market liberalism can be interpreted differently when it comes to decentralisation: both the Partido Popular and the Conservative Party have both at different times used economic justifications for a strong central state. The Partido Popular continues to hold a conservative view of decentralisation and the Conservatives have only recently started to link their market liberalism to a justification for decentralisation. Thus, whilst it is possible to construct a liberal economic case for devolving power away from the central state, one does not necessarily follow the other.

This article examines the territorial statecraft of the Conservative Party both internally and in the coalition government since 2010. Using Bulpitt's statecraft framework alongside some more recent work on UK intergovernmental relations, it argues that the Conservative Party has pursued broadly the same strategy as the previous Labour administration: centre autonomy management. Thus, as long as the devolved administrations and Welsh and Scottish Conservatives stick to their low politics remit, territorial policy divergence and autonomy remain mostly irrelevant to the centre. In terms of intergovernmental relations, the Conservatives have handled territorial politics in coalition reasonably well. However, the recent Scotland Act and the Commission on Welsh Devolution point towards a future of sharing Treasury control over UK public finances. With the centre's governing autonomy increasingly compromised, the Conservative Party faces the challenge of creating a new strategy which allows it to pursue its priorities.

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