We aim to provide insight into the observed equity home bias phenomenon by analyzing the determinants of U.S. holdings of equities across a wide range of countries. In particular, we explore the role of information costs in determining the country distribution of U.S. investors' equity holdings using a comprehensive new data set on U.S. ownership of foreign stocks. We find that U.S. holdings of a country's equities are positively related to the share of that country's stock market that is listed on U.S. exchanges, even after controlling for capital controls, trade links, transaction costs, and historical risk-adjusted returns. We attribute this finding to the fact that foreign firms that list on U.S. exchanges are obliged to provide standardized, credible financial information, thereby reducing information costs incurred by U.S. investors. This obligation stems from U.S. investor protection regulations, which include stringent disclosure requirements, reconciliation of financial statements to U.S. standards, and an investor-friendly regulatory environment. Our results support the hypothesis that information costs are an important source of home bias: Foreign countries whose firms do not alleviate information costs by listing on a U.S. exchange are more severely underweighted in U.S. equity portfolios.JEL Classification: G11, G15, M40, K00

We aim to provide insight into the observed equity home bias phenomenon by analyzing the determinants of U.S. holdings of equities across a wide range of countries. In particular, we explore the role of information costs in determining the country distribution of U.S. investors' equity holdings using a comprehensive new data set on U.S. ownership of foreign stocks. We find that U.S. holdings of a country's equities are positively related to the share of that country's stock market that is listed on U.S. exchanges, even after controlling for capital controls, trade links, transaction costs, and historical risk-adjusted returns. We attribute this finding to the fact that foreign firms that list on U.S. exchanges are obliged to provide standardized, credible financial information, thereby reducing information costs incurred by U.S. investors. This obligation stems from U.S. investor protection regulations, which include stringent disclosure requirements, reconciliation of financial statements to U.S. standards, and an investor-friendly regulatory environment. Our results support the hypothesis that information costs are an important source of home bias: Foreign countries whose firms do not alleviate information costs by listing on a U.S. exchange are more severely underweighted in U.S. equity portfolios.JEL Classification: G11, G15, M40, K00

It is often claimed that one contributing factor to Japan's weak economic performance over the past decade is that Japanese banks have continued to provide financial support for highly inefficient, debt-ridden companies, commonly referred to as "zombie" firms.Such poor banking practices in turn prevent more productive companies from gaining market share, strangling a potentially important source of productivity gains for the overall economy. To explore further the zombie-firm hypothesis, we use industry-and firm-level Japanese data and find evidence that productivity growth is low in industries reputed to have heavy concentrations of zombie firms. We also find that the reallocation of market share is going in the wrong direction in these industries, adding to already weak productivity performance. In addition, we find evidence that financial support from Japanese banks may have played a role in sustaining this perverse reallocation of market share.