In this essay, we study the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) from the theoretical perspective of the “rhizome” coined by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. We understand organizing in general and conflict emergence in particular through the becoming of the rhizomatic ontology of organizing. In our view, the emergence of organizing is a manifestation of a rhizomatic basis of things, seen in nomadic strategies of pursuing revolutionary aims and resisting power hegemonies. We discuss how armed resistance groups relate to time and duration, and their stark contrast to Western professional, expeditionary armies operating in a clearly defined space and time. We complement the established philosophical and organizing-theoretical approaches to being and becoming in understanding conflict emergence with the rhizomatic perspective. We conclude our essay by discussing both theoretical and practical implications for understanding and managing conflict.

In this reflective paper, we study the tension between leadership and institutional control in contemporary Western military organizations. More precisely, we focus on two (out of five) NATO measures of merit, namely the Measure of Performance (MOP) and the Measure of Effectiveness (MOE), and how they manifest this tension at the operational level. We suggest that fixed leadership roles are not enough -what is required instead is an adaptive, pragmatic and even rebellious attitude towards the military bureaucracy in the contemporary, ever-changing conflict landscape.

This article describes how Public Safety Organisations (PSO) come up against hybrid, demanding operations like terrorist attack or school shootings more frequently. Obtaining a realistic situation picture is crucial in organising the rescue operation and in minimising further violence. The role of PSOs' 24/7 situation centres becomes vital. In this paper, the authors explore how PSOs can ensure an information flow and a situation picture in hybrid environments. The empirical data were official reports and the data collected through interviews with staff at different PSOs. It was analysed using qualitative content analysis. Achieving a common operational picture involves taking account of each authority's needs and constraints, thereby enabling the exchange of relevant information between key authorities on-scene and off-scene. In addition, human factors play an important role in complex, multi-authority missions. Furthermore, the increasing role of citizens and social media in producing valuable information should not be overlooked.

The development of communications technology has enabled the internet to become a new theatre of military operations. The influence aspects of military operations in information battlespace, however, are difficult both in theory and in practice, especially concerning international law. As a result, there is a variety of national and organizational solutions of how to divide tasks and responsibilities between authorities. This asymmetry generated by different approaches and rules of conduct provides opportunities for actors with more relaxed interpretation of international law, allowing them to use weapons of influence in order to pursue military goals. In this article the authors ask whether military influence operations, just like cyber operations, could be treated as acts of war. To help militaries address the complex issue of influence operations, a framework consisting of three categories is suggested.

No abstract

Security strategy work requires a definition for ’cyberspace’. This article discusses national definitions and analyses their contents. Defining what cyberspace is equals the exercise of political power. Therefore, it is important to discuss what the definitions mean in practice - whether cyberspace is seen as a restricted mathematical-technological domain or a social construction. Government publications highlight the technological aspect of cyberspace, whereas threats stem from human behaviour. For some, cyberspace is a primary operational environment for national security that must be protected with defensive and offensive military means. For others, cyberspace is primarily a digital civil society in which the free flow and usability of information and the identity and anonymity of citizens must be secured. Cyberspace can also be seen as a place for business, where material and immaterial products and services can be offered. The authors argue for the broad definition of cyberspace, incorporating both technological and social concepts. But cyberspace may never be comprehensively defined. If only a strictly technology-oriented approach is used to define cyberspace, many of its risks and problems cannot be addressed. Cyberspace allows the exercise of power; therefore, its definition should not be reduced to pure technology.

No abstract

No abstract