This paper investigates the predictive power of global geopolitical risks (GPR) index on daily returns and price volatility of Bitcoin over the period July 18, 2010-November 30, 2017. Considering a Bayesian Graphical Structural Vector Autoregressive (BSGVAR) technique, we find that GPR has a predictive power on both returns and price volatility of Bitcoin. The results of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations show that price volatility and returns of Bitcoin are positively and negatively related to the GPR, respectively. However, findings from the Quantile-on-Quantile (QQ) estimations state that effects are positive at the higher quantiles of both the GPR as well as price volatility and returns of Bitcoin. Therefore, we conclude that Bitcoin can be considered as a hedging tool against global geopolitical risks.

This study investigates the behavioral aspects of Islamic bank depositors in a dual banking system. By categorizing depositors into groups based on the amount of their deposited funds, we estimate the responses of these groups to interest rate changes. We take the findings of conventional banks as a comparative baseline and investigate the extent to which the changes in different Islamic depositor groups differ from conventional depositor groups. The findings show that depositors in both Islamic and conventional banks respond to interest rate changes. The analysis indicates that Islamic bank depositors are more responsive when their deposit sizes are larger. When Islamic bank depositors' opportunity costs rise due to a rise in the interest rate, they do not hesitate to withdraw deposits. The relation between interest rate changes and deposits is more robust in Islamic banks than in conventional banks.

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Although it has been intensively claimed that Islamic banks are more subject to market discipline, the empirical literature is surprisingly mute on this topic. To fill this gap and to verify the conjecture that Islamic bank depositors are indeed able to monitor and discipline their banks, we use Turkey as a test setting. The theory of market discipline predicts that when excessive risk taking occurs, depositors will ask higher returns on their deposits or withdraw their funds. We look at the effect of the deposit insurance reform in which the dual deposit insurance was revised and all banks were put under the same deposit insurance company in December 2005. This gives us a natural experiment in which the effect of the reform can be compared for the treatment group (i.e., Islamic banks) and control group (i.e., conventional banks). We find that the deposit insurance reform has increased market discipline in the Turkish Islamic banking sector. This reform may have upset the sensitivities of the religiously inspired depositors, and perhaps more importantly it might have terminated the existing mutual supervision and support among Islamic banks.JEL codes: G23, G28, O52

This study attempts to give an insight about the trend in the performance of the Turkish banking sector by conducting a panel data fixed effects regression analysis. The results reveal that efficiency change is negatively related to the number of branches. We find a positive relationship between loan ratio and the performance indices efficiency and efficiency change. Furthermore, bank capitalization is positively related to efficiency change. Interestingly however, return on equity is not statistically significant in explaining any of the efficiency measures. There is also no robust relationship between foreign ownership and efficiency. Finally, restructuring attempts in post-crises epoch robustly account for the improvement in efficiency scores in recent years.

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We examine the interest rate sensitivity of both deposits and credits at Islamic and conventional banks in Turkey. We find that the bank lending channel is especially operative for Islamic banks. Impulse responses for conventional and Islamic banks reveal that Islamic bank depositors’ sensitivity to policy rate changes is substantially larger than that of conventional bank depositors. Next to heavily dependence on deposit funding, we consider that inertia in Islamic bank deposit rates impedes these banks to keep those depositors who consider the opportunity cost of monetary policy rates is unbearable. On the lending side, we obtain similar results, implying that tight monetary policy leads to a larger contraction in Islamic bank credits. This finding is a reflection of the favourable attitude of Islamic banks towards small and medium‐sized enterprise (SME) financing. When similar relationships are analysed for currency and inflation shocks, we again find larger responses for Islamic banks showing the cyclical nature of SME credits.

This paper addresses the issue of the low level of private investment in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, with special emphasis on the role of governance. Based on the existing published reports, we categorize what types of governance institutions are more detrimental to entrepreneurial investments. We then estimate a simultaneous model of private investment and governance quality where economic policies concurrently explain both variables. Our empirical results show that governance plays a significant role in private investment decisions. This result is particularly true in the case of "administrative quality" in the form of control of corruption, bureaucratic quality, investment-friendly profile of administration, law and order, as well as for "political stability." Evidence in favor of "public accountability" is also found. Our estimations also stress that structural reforms like financial development, trade openness, and human development affect privateinvestment decisions directly, and/or through their positive effect on governance.