This paper explores the role of professional experts in the diffusion of innovative practices that subvert the interests of stakeholders. I do so by studying the role of external auditors in the diffusion of stock-option backdating in the United States. Practices that are eventually accepted as misconduct may emerge as liminal practices, not categorized as misconduct until social control agents notice, scrutinize, and react to them. I examine how the role of external auditors in the diffusion of stock-option backdating changed as the practice shifted from liminality to being illegal and illegitimate. The findings suggest that professional experts' involvement in the diffusion of liminal practices is highly responsive to the institutional environment. Initially, professional experts diffuse these practices via local networks. However, when the legal environment becomes more stringent, implying that the practice will become illegitimate, these offices reverse their role and extinguish the practice. The larger network remains largely uninvolved in both the diffusion, and extinguishment, of the liminal practice.

We examine whether prosperous economic times have both immediate and lasting implications for corporate misconduct among CEOs. Drawing on research suggesting that prosperous times are associated with excessive risk-taking, overconfidence, and more opportunities to cheat, we first propose that CEOs will be more likely to engage in corporate misconduct during good economic times. Next, we propose that CEOs who begin their careers in prosperous times will be more likely to engage in self-serving corporate misconduct later in their careers. We tested these hypotheses by assembling a large dataset of American CEOs and following their stock option reporting patterns between 1996 and 2005. We found that in good economic times, CEOs were more likely to backdate their stock options grants. Moreover, CEOs who began their careers in prosperous times were more likely to backdate stock option grants later in their careers. These findings suggest that the state of the economy can influence current ethical behavior and leave a lasting imprint on the moral proclivities of new workforce entrants.

Whilst existing research generally assumes corporate social responsibility (CSR) is seen as universally positive, firms increasingly adopt practices, and take stands, on highly polarizing social issues (e.g., gun-control, LGBTQ rights, abortion). To better understand this phenomenon, we develop a theory about when firms will emulate, ignore, or oppose each other's CSR efforts, based on attributes of the underlying social issue (its salience and polarization), the level of market competition, and the substantiveness of CSR. Our theory predicts several distinct equilibrium outcomes, including the potential for social counter-positioning, whereby rival firms take advantage of socio-political polarization to horizontally differentiate by taking opposing stances on a polarizing issue. Counterpositioning is more likely when salience is high, but agreement is low, when markets are competitive, and when CSR is largely symbolic. Managerial Summary: Firms increasingly find themselves drawn, willingly or not, to taking stances on a controversial social issue (e.g., gun rights, abortion), though doing so risks alienating (some) stakeholders. In this paper, we develop a theory of why, when, and how firms should take a stance on a polarizing issue.

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