No abstract

No abstract

Ample empirical evidence points to recent power shifts in multiple areas of international relations taking place between industrialized countries and emerging powers, and between states and non-state actors. Yet there is a dearth of theoretical interpretation and synthesis of these findings, and a growing need for coherent approaches to understand and measure the transformation. This edited series aims to bring together scholars from all major world regions as well as different disciplines in order to discuss and possibly blend their different approaches and provide new frameworks for the understanding of global affairs and the governance of global power shifts. More information about this series at

No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

It took three weeks of waiting and six days of fighting in early May 1967 to change the face of the Middle East. Besides the remarkable victory, scholars also concentrate on the three weeks of waiting, which they see as days that "convey the sense of anxiety and indecision then prevailing in Israel." 1 The anxiety refers to the sense of danger emanating from the amassment of forces along its borders, and the signing of military pacts between Egypt and Syria, and Egypt and Jordan. The indecision relates to the internal debate that took place between the military and the government about Israel's reaction to the entry of Egyptian forces into the Sinai on May 14, 1967. The debate, which on some occasions was sharp and heated, and the appointment of the former IDF Chief of Staff, Gen. (res.) Moshe Dayan to the Ministry of Defense instead of Prime Minister Levy Eshkol, strengthened the notion of a weak government blindly seeking a way out of the crisis in the face of militant and demanding military officers and a worried public. 2 This notion though misses the true nature of the Israeli government's conduct, as the waiting period was not a time of hesitation and stumbling, but an essential necessity. This was for two reasons: war at that time served no Israeli interest, and the waiting period was used by the government to allow time for diplomacy to overcome obstacles that otherwise would have annulled any achievement on the battlefield.The Israeli government did not want a war, as Israel's geostrategic environment significantly improved in the decade that followed the 1956 Sinai Campaign. The infiltrations from the neighboring countries, which during 1949-1956 were endemic and quite disturbing, ceased. While during the first years of independence, Israel had difficulty in procuring arms, things changed during the second half of the 1950s, and it had no problem buying all the weapons it needed, first from France and later from Britain and other Europeans states.

No abstract