Chile presents a paradox for legislative studies. In most comparative research on the political power of presidents and assemblies in Latin America, the Chilean presidency is considered one of the most powerful in the region. The country's congress is seen, accordingly, as weak and lacking influence over public policy. Such evaluations, however, tend to be based on constitutional and legal faculties (that is, formal powers), and they overlook the substantial influence exerted by the Chilean Congress through informal political channels. This article analyzes literature on informal politics that shows the substantial influence of Chile's Congress on public policy; and, for comparison, presents an empirical study that adds several details to current accounts of congressional influence on the bureaucracy in Chile and describes two mechanisms of congressional influence not contemplated by recent research.

No abstract

No abstract

Does more citizen participation necessarily improve the democratic quality and/or the effectiveness of government? What forms of participation have the potential to accomplish these goals? And, more important, how can these participatory mechanisms be integrated into traditional representative and bureaucratic governance practices, in order to grasp this potential? We discuss these questions in the article, building on theories and empirical evidence provided by both political science and public administration studies. The conclusion we reach is that participatory empowered mechanisms, such as popular initiatives and referendums, and public-private co-governance councils, have a clear potential to enhance the effectiveness and responsiveness of public governance. However, we also find that in order to secure these benefits and not compromise equality and accountability, the introduction of these mechanisms needs to come together with strong and highly representative legislatures, and with reforms that align the powers and increase the representativeness of interest groups.

No abstract