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This paper uses administrative data from Value Added Tax (VAT) returns to provide insights on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in Rwanda. We show that the lockdown in Rwanda had a severe impact on the domestic economy, despite relatively low case numbers. However, the economy quickly rebounded after restrictions were lifted, with overall sales losses amounting to 5 per cent of GDP. Although in absolute terms, these losses are concentrated amongst the largest firms, in proportional terms, small firms have been worse affected. We also show that firms providing accommodation, food and transport services, as well as those based in the capital, have been particularly affected by the crisis. Overall, the decline in economic activity translates to a 5.1 per cent loss in VAT revenue for the government. Our results offer policy-makers evidence on the real impact of the crisis, both in aggregate terms and disaggregated by firm size, sector, and location. In a literature that has largely focused on higher-income countries, these results complement projections to inform appropriate policy responses in the specific context of low-income countries.

This paper evaluates the appropriateness of the tax policymaking process that led to the introduction, and the later adaptation, of a tax on mobile money transactions in Uganda in 2018. We examine the unusual source of the proposal, how this particular tax diverged from the usual tax policymaking process, and whether certain key stakeholders were excluded. We argue that weaknesses in the tax policymaking process undermined the quality of policy design, and resulted in a period of costly, and avoidable, policy adjustment. This case study is relevant for Uganda as well as for other low-income countries which could be exposed to similar challenges in designing effective taxes for the mobile money industry.

Many low-income countries are increasingly digitising various tax services, usually motivated by efforts to increase efficiency and transparency and reduce the burden of compliance for taxpayers. However, where awareness and adoption are suboptimal, tax e services may produce only partial benefits. In this paper, we examine the adoption of tax e-services in Rwanda, a low-income country which has invested significant resources in digitalising government service delivery and made tax e-services mandatory from 2015. Using a combination of panel survey and tax administrative data, we study the drivers and impacts of e-services awareness and adoption. We find evidence that, before the pandemic, female and less educated taxpayers, with less sophisticated businesses, were left behind in technology adoption, even where e-services were the only option for taxpayers. Exploiting the outbreak of COVID-19 during our data collection, we also study shifts precipitated by a shock that normalised digital transactions. Take-up of e-services is remarkable two years after the pandemic, but still not universal. For those not using the e services the same challenges in access persist – indicating the potential for more targeted policy interventions. Interestingly, technology adoption is not strongly related with filing behaviour, and we study the reasons why non-filers report using the tools and, on the contrary, why active filers report they do not. Also, we do not find any significant impact of e-services adoption on perceived fairness of the tax system and overall willingness to pay, which we hypothesised benefit from e-services. Finally, using evidence from qualitative interviews, we highlight practical challenges in using e-services, such as connectivity problems and slow systems, which undermine the potential benefits.

Digital financial services (DFS) have expanded rapidly over the last decade, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. They have been accompanied by claims that they can alleviate poverty, empower women, help businesses grow, and improve macroeconomic outcomes and government effectiveness. As they have become more widespread, some controversy has arisen as governments have identified DFS revenues and profits as potential sources of tax revenue. Evidence-based policy in relation to taxing DFS requires an understanding of the enablers and barriers (preconditions) of DFS, as well as the impacts of DFS. This report aims to present insights from an Evidence Gap Map (EGM) on the enablers and barriers, and subsequent impacts, of DFS, including any research related to taxation. An EGM serves to clearly identify the gaps in the evidence base in a visually intuitive way, allowing researchers to address these gaps. This can help to shape future research agendas. Our EGM draws on elements from the systematic review methodology. We develop a transparent set of inclusion criteria and comprehensive search strategy to identify relevant studies, and assess the confidence we can place in their causal findings. An extensive search initially identified 389 studies, 205 of which met the inclusion criteria and were assessed based on criteria of cogency, transparency and credibility. We categorised 40 studies as high confidence, 97 as medium confidence, and 68 as low confidence. We find that the evidence base is still relatively thin, but growing rapidly. The high-confidence evidence base is dominated by quantitative approaches, especially experimental study designs. The geographical focus of many studies is East Africa. The dominant DFS intervention studied is mobile money. The majority of studies focus on DFS usage for payments and transfers; fewer studies focus on savings, very few on credit, and none on insurance. The strongest evidence base on enablers and barriers relates to how user attributes and industry structure affect DFS. Little is known about how policy and politics, including taxation, and macroeconomic and social factors, affect DFS. The evidence base on impacts is strongest at the individual and household level, and partly covers the business level. The impact of DFS on the macroeconomy, and the meso level of industry and government, is very limited. We find no high-confidence evidence on the role of taxation. We need more higher quality evidence on a variety of topics. This should particularly look at enablers, constraints and impacts, including the role of taxation, beyond the individual and household level. Research going forward should cover more geographic areas and a wider range of purposes DFS can serve (use cases), including savings, and particularly credit. More methodological variety should be encouraged – experiments can be useful, but are not the best method for all research questions.