Mimblewimble (MW) is a privacy-oriented cryptocurrency technology that provides security and scalability properties that distinguish it from other protocols of its kind. We present and discuss those properties and outline the basis of a model-driven verification approach to address the certification of the correctness of the protocol implementations. In particular, we propose an idealized model that is key in the described verification process, and identify and precisely state [Review 2]sufficientthe conditions for our model to ensure the verification of the relevant security properties of MW. Since MW is built on top of a consensus protocol, we develop a Z specification of one such protocol and present an excerpt of the prototype after its Z specification. This prototype can be used as an executable model. [Review 3]where simulations can be run This allows us to analyze the behavior of the protocol without having to implement it in a low level programming language. Finally, we analyze the Grin and Beam implementations of MW in their current state of development.
Formal methods (FM) are mathematics-based software development methods aimed at producing ``code for a nuclear power reactor''. That is, due application of FM can produce bug-free, zero-defect, correct-by-construction, guaranteed, certified software. However, the software industry seldom use FM. One of the main reasons for such a situation is that there exists the perception (which might well be a fact) that FM increase software costs. On the other hand, FM can be partially applied thus producing high-quality software, although not necessarily bug-free.
In this paper we outline some FM related techniques whose application the cryptocurrency community should take into consideration because they could bridge the gap between ``loose web code'' and ``code for a nuclear power reactor''. We include relevant case studies in the area of cryptocurrency.
MimbleWimble (MW) is a privacy-oriented cryptocurrency technology which provides security and scalability properties that distinguish it from other protocols of its kind. We present and discuss those properties and outline the basis of a model-driven verification approach to address the certification of the correctness of the protocol implementations. In particular, we propose an idealized model that is key in the described verification process, and identify and precisely state sufficient conditions for our model to ensure the verification of relevant security properties of MW. Since MW is built on top of a consensus protocol, we develop a Z specification of one such protocol and present an excerpt of the {log} prototype generated from the Z specification. This {log} prototype can be used as an executable model where simulations can be run. This allows us to analyze the behavior of the protocol without having to implement it in a low level programming language. Finally, we analyze the Grin and Beam implementations of MW in their current state of development.
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