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PurposeThis study aims to investigate the impact of ownership by large shareholders (blockholders) on corporate cash holdings. The study further investigates heterogeneity in the relationship between blockholder ownership and corporate cash holdings.Design/methodology/approachBuilding on the precautionary and agency motives of corporate cash holdings, the study focuses on publicly listed firms from 22 European countries for the period from 2006 to 2015. Multiple pooled ordinary least square and fixed effects regression models are employed to examine the relationship between blockholder ownership and firms’ cash holdings.FindingsThis study documents a positive relationship between blockholder ownership and corporate cash holdings which indicates the role of blockholders in influencing firms’ cash holdings policies. However, further analyses show that the effect of blockholding on cash holdings depends on the type of blockholder. While the relationship is still positive between cash holdings and ownership by strategic blockholders, it turns negative for the ownership by institutional blockholders.Research limitations/implicationsThis study provides evidence for the important role played by firms’ ownership structures, and especially blockholding, in shaping firms’ cash holdings decisions. The findings are therefore of great value for investors, firms’ management and board and policy makers.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to the literature by providing an explanation of the contradictory results documented in the literature on the impact of blockholders on corporate cash holdings. This study, to the best of the author’s knowledge, is the first to examine the effect of blockholder ownership on cash holdings by distinguishing between different types of blockholder.

Focusing on the role of the institutional investment horizon as a monitoring mechanism that enhances companies’ sustainability reporting reliability, this study investigates the association between long-term ownership and companies’ decisions to assure their sustainability report. Further, the study examines the moderating effect of the quality of governance on this association. Consistent with the critical mass theory, the study argues that long-term ownership should reach a certain threshold to have an influence on companies’ assurance decisions. The study’s results support the argument and find that long-term ownership is positively and significantly associated with companies’ assurance decisions, and the association is positive and significant only for a high level of long-term ownership in comparison to low- and medium-level long-term ownership. Moreover, the study finds that the association between long-term ownership and assurance is negatively moderated by the quality of governance at both the company and country levels.

This study investigates the influence of corporate cash holdings on the flow of open-end equity mutual funds. Building on the economic mechanisms that drive investors’ decisions when they construct their portfolio, the study analyses a comprehensive global dataset that includes 13,674 firms and 58,406 funds from 23 countries for the period from 2008 to 2017. Multiple regression models (pooled and fixed effect) are implemented to explore this relationship. The results show that there is a negative relationship between mutual fund flow and corporate cash holdings which indicates the significant role corporate cash holding policies have on the mutual fund industry. This article contributes to the literature by adding a new factor that can explain mutual fund investors’ behaviour. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first study to examine the relationship between corporate cash holdings and mutual fund flow, and one of the few studies to examine the influence of corporate-level decisions on the mutual fund industry. The results could help fund managers to better forecast future fund flow by considering corporate-level policies, namely cash holdings.