This UK study investigates whether the stock market prefers companies to award the positions of chairman and chief executive officer to two different people instead of permitting a single individual, the 'dual CEO', to combine them. The results suggest (a) that the market responds favourably to the separation of the two roles and unfavourably to their fusion and (b) that the accounting performance of companies which adopt a 'dual CEO' appears to decline subsequent to this change.

Investigates the stock market response to interactive dividend and earnings announcements by a sample of 620 UK companies over the period January to June 1991. First, examines the possibility that the response to a dividend announcement may be influenced by whether the dividend is being increased, decreased or left unchanged. US studies suggest that this may indeed be the case and acknowledge the role of the dividend as a signal to investors; dividend increases tend to be associated with positive abnormal returns, and dividend decreases tend to be associated with negative abnormal returns around the time of the dividend announcement. Second, recognizes that identifying a unique dividend information announcement effect is particularly difficult in the UK because UK dividends are almost invariably announced simultaneously with information about corporate earnings. Addresses this problem by focusing on those occasions when the signals associated with these announcements conflict with one another ‐ where dividends are increased and earnings decrease or vice versa. The influence of combinations of dividend and earnings news is found to be important in explaining the share price reaction on the announcement day.

In this paper we provide novel evidence about the market reaction to capital expenditure announcements in the UK using a sample of nearly 500 disclosures made between 1989 and 1991. First, we show that the market reaction to joint venture announcements is significantly positive, whilst similar announcements from individual companies do not elicit any response. Second, we find that the market reaction to single company investments is positively related to the size of the expenditure, but only for projects which immediately generate cash. Finally, we report that the variability in the market response to announcements which follow large cash inflows is significantly lower than the variability in investors' reactions to announcements which are not preceded by such inflows. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999.

The results of this paper reveal a significantly negative relationship between the equity stake owned by a senior executive and the likelihood that this executive will be removed from office. We also establish the existence of a strong positive relationship between poor company performance and the likelihood that the top managers responsible will be forced out of their firms; this forced departure only tends to occur when the managers' stake in the firm is less than 1%; as the level of ownership rises, managers become increasingly entrenched in their posts. The stock market reaction to management change is greatest (a) when the departure is unexpected and (b) when the dismissed executive owns more than 5% of the equity of his company. This study also examines the influence of other aspects of ownership structure and board composition upon the likelihood of a top executive dismissal. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998.

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