Young Children’s Verbal Misrepresentations of Reality

Stouthamer‐Loeber, Magda

doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-3134-9_3

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…There may be serious consequences to a parent-child relationship if the parent does not trust the child and take their verbal statements at face value (De-Paulo & Jordan, 1982). Stouthamer-Loeber (1991) reported that mothers get along less well with those children who they see as lying more frequently. On the other hand, if a parent does not detect a child's dishonest behavior, they are not able to correct these behaviors or teach children the value of (Crossman & Lewis, 2006).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Detecting children’s lies: Are parents accurate judges of their own children’s lies?

Talwar

Renaud

Conway

2015

Journal of Moral Education

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Detecting children’s lies: Are parents accurate judges of their own children’s lies?

Talwar

Renaud

Conway

2015

Journal of Moral Education

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“…There were strong reasons for the claims: first, there was a priori logic (Flanagan 1992) and the fact that three year olds failed false belief tasks (Perner et al 1987) even when administered by parents sceptical about the possibility of their failure at this task (V. Reddy 1989, personal observation); second, the finding that three year olds in experimental tasks of deception seemed unable to 'point out the wrong window' to an experimenter despite intense frustration at repeatedly losing the 'reward' of a chocolate trial after trial (Russell et al 1991), although they were capable of physically sabotaging a competitor's success (Sodian 1991(Sodian , 1994; and third, the remarkable set of findings that high functioning children with autism failed 'theory of mind' tasks (Baron-Cohen et al 1985) and were reportedly unable to lie. In addition, three year olds did not seem able to understand lying in others (Coleman & Kay 1981 1 ) and even parents (when asked to report in general and retrospectively) reported low frequencies of different forms of lying before 4 years of age (Stouthamer-Loeber 1991), although when asked to actually observe and report on their three year olds' current deceptions, they did label them deceptive (Newton 1994).…”

Section: Lies Before False Beliefs?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Getting back to the rough ground: deception and ‘social living’

Reddy

2007

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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At the heart of the social intelligence hypothesis is the central role of 'social living'. But living is messy and psychologists generally seek to avoid this mess in the interests of getting clean data and cleaner logical explanations. The study of deception as intelligent action is a good example of the dangers of such avoidance. We still do not have a full picture of the development of deceptive actions in human infants and toddlers or an explanation of why it emerges. This paper applies Byrne & Whiten's functional taxonomy of tactical deception to the social behaviour of human infants and toddlers using data from three previous studies. The data include a variety of acts, such as teasing, pretending, distracting and concealing, which are not typically considered in relation to human deception. This functional analysis shows the onset of non-verbal deceptive acts to be surprisingly early. Infants and toddlers seem to be able to communicate false information (about themselves, about shared meanings and about events) as early as true information. It is argued that the development of deception must be a fundamentally social and communicative process and that if we are to understand why deception emerges at all, the scientist needs to get 'back to the rough ground' as Wittgenstein called it and explore the messy social lives in which it develops.

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“…Three‐year‐olds seem to be unable to misinform another person about a reward in order to get it for themselves, and even show frustration at this inability (Peskin, 1992; Ruffman, Olson, Ash, & Keenan, 1993; Sodian, 1991, 1994). Parents report the onset of deceptive behaviour and lying at around 4 years (Stouthamer‐Loeber, 1991). Children with autism who classically fail FB tasks are also notably poor at deception (Sodian, 1993).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deception dissociates from false belief reasoning in deaf children: Implications for the implicit versus explicit theory of mind distinction

Villiers

2011

British J of Dev Psycho

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Deception is a controversial aspect of theory of mind, and researchers disagree about whether it entails an understanding of the false beliefs of one's opponent. The present study asks whether children with delayed language and delayed explicit false belief reasoning can succeed on explicit deception tasks. Participants were 45 orally taught deaf children with varying language delays aged 4.5-8 years and 45 hearing children aged 3.5-6 years. Participants received a battery of language, executive function, deception, and both verbal and low-verbal false belief tasks. The result reveal a dissociation of deception and false belief tasks: the deaf children are on par with their hearing peers on deception games, but show significant delays in false belief tasks even when the language demands are made minimal. Furthermore, different skills are predictors of success for the two types of task in the deaf children: language, and in particular complement syntax, is the best predictor of false belief reasoning; but executive function skills, especially inhibitory control, are the best predictors of deception. It is argued that deception at this level can be handled by behaviour rules without reference to mental states.

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Young Children’s Verbal Misrepresentations of Reality

Cited by 10 publications

References 21 publications

Detecting children’s lies: Are parents accurate judges of their own children’s lies?

Detecting children’s lies: Are parents accurate judges of their own children’s lies?

Getting back to the rough ground: deception and ‘social living’

Deception dissociates from false belief reasoning in deaf children: Implications for the implicit versus explicit theory of mind distinction

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