You Really Do Imagine It: Against Error Theories of Imagination

Küng, Peter

doi:10.1111/nous.12060

Cited by 66 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…20 For example, Peter Kung (2014) suggests that a Kripke-style view has implausible consequences if the data are taken to be the deliverances of imagination -since it seems clear that we can imagine what we know to be impossible. 21 develops a complicated taxonomy of conceivings designed to uphold the claim that, though what initially seems conceivable is indeed (in some sense) conceivable, it is only those scenarios conceivable in another sense that can provide evidence for claims about what it possible.…”

Section: Kripkean Redescription and 'Error Theories'mentioning

confidence: 96%

The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods

Daly¹

2015

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Section: Kripkean Redescription and 'Error Theories'mentioning

confidence: 96%

The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods

Daly¹

2015

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“…The purpose of this paper is to argue that HOP is false. This has already been done several times (e.g., Byrne 2007 ; Fiocco 2007 ; Jago 2014 ; Kung 2014 ; Priest 2016 ). What is, hopefully, new, is the idea that cognitive psychology can help to fine-tune the notions of conceivability and imagination, which are relevant for the assessment of HOP.…”

Section: Hume’s Other Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, in Naming and Necessity Kripke proposes a different diagnosis of the phenomenon, which, according to Kung ( 2014 ), amounts to an attempt to support HOP by explaining contrary appearances away via an error theory. Kripke has little to say on the psychology of the mental representations involved in HOP.…”

Section: Kripkean Error Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceivability and possibility: some dilemmas for Humeans

Berto

Schoonen

2017

Synthese

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The Humean view that conceivability entails possibility can be criticized via input from cognitive psychology. A mainstream view here has it that there are two candidate codings for mental representations (one of them being, according to some, reducible to the other): the linguistic and the pictorial, the difference between the two consisting in the degree of arbitrariness of the representation relation. If the conceivability of P at issue for Humeans involves the having of a linguistic mental representation, then it is easy to show that we can conceive the impossible, for impossibilities can be represented by meaningful bits of language. If the conceivability of P amounts to the pictorial imaginability of a situation verifying P, then the question is whether the imagination at issue works purely qualitatively, that is, only by phenomenological resemblance with the imagined scenario. If so, the range of situations imaginable in this way is too limited to have a significant role in modal epistemology. If not, imagination will involve some arbitrary labeling component, which turns out to be sufficient for imagining the impossible. And if the relevant imagination is neither

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“…Many(Byrne 2007;Fiocco 2007;Jago 2014;Kung 2014;Priest 2016) think that, contra Hume, we can imagine the absolutely impossible. I agree, seeBerto and Schoonen (2017).…”

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confidence: 99%

Taming the runabout imagination ticket

Berto

2018

Synthese

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The 'puzzle of imaginative use' (Kind and Kung in Knowledge through imagination, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) asks: given that imagination is arbitrary escape from reality, how can it have any epistemic value? In particular, imagination seems to be logically anarchic, like a runabout inference ticket: one who imagines A may also imagine whatever B pops to one's mind by free mental association. This paper argues that at least a certain kind of imaginative exercisereality-oriented mental simulation-is not logically anarchic. Showing this is part of the task of solving the puzzle. Six plausible features of imagination, so understood, are listed. Then a formal semantics is provided, whose patterns of logical validity and invalidity model the six features.

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You Really Do Imagine It: Against Error Theories of Imagination

Cited by 66 publications

References 34 publications

The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods

The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods

Conceivability and possibility: some dilemmas for Humeans

Taming the runabout imagination ticket

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