You Can't Trust a Philosopher

Fumerton, Richard

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0006

Cited by 66 publications

(18 citation statements)

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“…The fact that my belief is my belief creates evidential asymmetry, which allows me the epistemic right to be steadfast regarding P. For instance, Richard Fumerton insists that reliance on my own reasoning must be primary because “I do know how I reason better than I know how others reason. It is important to keep firmly in mind that in the final analysis there really is no alternative to the egocentric perspective” (, 106). He goes on to note that the primacy of one’s own reasoning is demonstrated by the fact that any defeating force that another person’s competing belief might have presupposes this fact.…”

Section: Steadfast or Conciliatory?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Open‐Mindedness and Disagreement

Spiegel

2019

Metaphilosophy

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The current debate about disagreement has as rivals those who take the steadfast view and those who affirm conciliationism. Those on the steadfast side maintain that resolute commitment to a belief is reasonable despite peer disagreement. Conciliationists say that peer disagreement necessarily undermines warrant for one’s belief. This article discusses the relevance of open‐mindedness to the matter of peer disagreement. It shows how both the steadfast and the conciliatory perspective are consistent with a robust and substantive display of open‐mindedness. However, it also turns out that there are more ways to display open‐mindedness on the steadfast view than on the conciliatory view.

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Section: Steadfast or Conciliatory?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Open‐Mindedness and Disagreement

Spiegel

2019

Metaphilosophy

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“…Several authors have put forth skeptical arguments about philosophy that turn on the notion of disagreement (e.g., Feldman 2006, Frances 2010, Frances 2013, Fumerton 2010, Goldberg 2009, Kornblith 2010, Kornblith 2013.…”

Section: The Informal Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Worrisome Skepticism About Philosophy

Frances¹

2015

Episteme

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Abstract:A new kind of skepticism about philosophy is articulated and argued for. The key premise is the claim that many of us are well aware that in the past we failed to have good responses to substantive objections to our philosophical beliefs. The conclusion is disjunctive: either we are irrational in sticking with our philosophical beliefs, or we commit some other epistemic sin in having those beliefs.The new kind of skepticism described below makes me think that many of my most interesting beliefs are false and should be given up. Unlike traditional skepticism it's a kind of skepticism that is worrisome, as it points to falsehood (and not merely lack of knowledge) and says that we have to change our intellectual lives. And it starts with the most innocent and wise observations: for just about any philosophical view you once endorsed, if you are an experienced philosopher then you are fully aware that back when you endorsed it there were serious objections to it that you couldn't knock down.My goal in this essay is merely to set out the problem: since the problem is new, it would be over the top to think I have a solution to it. In the next section I start with an informal presentation of the argument, since it's novel and opinions may differ on how best to make it precise. Then I present one way to make the argument precise. Then I defend the premises. After that I consider the untoward epistemic consequences of philosophers who truly escape the argument's skeptical snare. I end the paper with remarks on applying the skeptical argument to areas other than philosophy.

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“…As Richard Fumerton points out, “[E]ach positive philosophical view is usually such that most philosophers think that it is false, and there is typically nothing approaching a consensus on the correct alternative. I can, therefore, infer that most philosophical views are false” (Fumerton , 109). It seems, therefore, that most things people would find interesting, original, and controversial are things that are likely to be false.…”

Section: The Problem In Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Richard Fumerton recently complained about the political views of philosophers, claiming that “people who clearly are in a position to know better use arguments that they would never endorse but for a desire to reach a certain conclusion,” and goes on to say: “If there is one thing I can be virtually certain of, it is that most philosophers are not reliable when it comes to arriving at interesting philosophical truth. And it does not help much to turn to ‘brilliant’ philosophers” (Fumerton , 107). This idea is also present in Descartes's motivation for engaging in philosophy.…”

Section: The Problem In Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophical Error and the Economics of Belief Formation

Skene

2015

Metaphilosophy

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Recent work has demonstrated that academic research faces serious challenges. Incentives to defend publishable ideas often lead researchers astray. Despite their tendency to produce error, efforts to publish erroneous results typically help a researcher's career. In addition, errors often arise from seemingly innocent methodological assumptions that allow researchers to believe their research is sound. This article discusses this research, as well as research into difficulties facing epistemic rationality caused by nonepistemic incentives. It then applies the lessons of this research to philosophical practice. It explains why philosophy likely suffers from these problems. It then provides an example of a widely shared methodological assumption that allows such research to be pursued and regularly published. It claims that the significance philosophers place on arguments is inappropriate, and that typical evaluations of philosophical arguments involve an instance of the base-rate fallacy. It concludes by discussing whether or not this article is self-defeating.

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You Can't Trust a Philosopher

Cited by 66 publications

References 0 publications

Open‐Mindedness and Disagreement

Open‐Mindedness and Disagreement

Worrisome Skepticism About Philosophy

Philosophical Error and the Economics of Belief Formation

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