You are Known by the Directors You Keep: Reputable Directors as a Signaling Mechanism for Young Firms

Deutsch, Yuval; Ross, Thomas W.

doi:10.1287/mnsc.49.8.1003.16399

Cited by 137 publications

(123 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Good reputation of directors attracts investors and gives them assurance that their investments are safe (Deutsch and Ross, 2003).  Other directorships.…”

Section: Social Capital Perspective Of Director Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate board failure in Zimbabwe: Have non – executive directors gone to sleep?

Sifile¹,

Suppiah²,

Tendai³

et al. 2014

IOSRJBM

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“…Good reputation of directors attracts investors and gives them assurance that their investments are safe (Deutsch and Ross, 2003).  Other directorships.…”

Section: Social Capital Perspective Of Director Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate board failure in Zimbabwe: Have non – executive directors gone to sleep?

Sifile¹,

Suppiah²,

Tendai³

et al. 2014

IOSRJBM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…In Anglo-Saxon countries, board composition with respect to the fractions of insiders and outsiders is endogenous and is shaped by the CEOs bargaining power (Adams et al 2010). Although empirical results are rather mixed, it is widely assumed that outsiders have a stronger incentive to monitor the top management team than insiders (see Deutsch/Ross, 2003). Thus, board composition is taken as an endogenous variable, analyzing the factors that shape the ratio of insiders in the board, like past performance of the CEO which increases his bargaining power (Jain/Tabak, 2008).…”

Section: Boards Of Directors In Entrepreneurial and Newly Listed Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate governance in newly listed companies

Audretsch

Lehmann

2013

Handbook of Research on IPOs

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Corporate governance in newly listed companiesTopics in corporate governance have been around in the literature almost for a century, most of the theoretical and empirical work has focused on the large and public company. While this research has improved our understanding of how large corporations are governed, corporate governance in small and medium sized enterprises and in particular in entrepreneurial and newly listed firms has rarely been studied. This essay offers a reflective overview of corporate governance mechanisms in entrepreneurial and newly listed companies and of why and how governance mechanisms differ from those in large and publicly traded corporations. In contrast to the traditional approach in corporate governance, we do not rely on the agency perspective as a work-horse to analyze governance problems. Instead we focus on either market or institutional based mechanisms in corporate governance. This opens the view on governance problems in newly listed companies outside the narrow view of either an agency or free-market perspective. Instead, the following study tries to bridge the different perspectives on corporate governance. From the broad set of mechanisms in corporate governance discussed in the literature, we focus only on a small subset which is prevalent in newly listed companies like the product and capital market, the market for corporate control, boards of directors and capital structures.-work in progress - UO-Working-Paper Series 03-13 AbstractTopics in corporate governance have been around in the literature almost for a century, most of the theoretical and empirical work has focused on the large and public company. While this research has improved our understanding of how large corporations are governed, corporate governance in small and medium sized enterprises and in particular in entrepreneurial and newly listed firms has rarely been studied. This essay offers a reflective overview of corporate governance mechanisms in entrepreneurial and newly listed companies and of why and how governance mechanisms differ from those in large and publicly traded corporations. In contrast to the traditional approach in corporate governance, we do not rely on the agency perspective as a work-horse to analyze governance problems. Instead we focus on either market or institutional based mechanisms in corporate governance. This opens the view on governance problems in newly listed companies outside the narrow v...

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“…Similar to corporate reputations, however, reputations of top management team members in new ventures in search of investment capital can derive from many sources. Earlier studies found a number of relations between the behavior of investors and the characteristics and personal background of an organization's board (Deutsch and Ross 2003), differentiating between the CEO (D'Aveni 1990; Gulati 2003, 2006;Cohen and Dean 2005) and other board members (Certo 2003;Musteen et al 2010), the management team (Beckman et al 2007;Beckman and Burton 2008) and the individual entrepreneur (Hsu 2007).…”

Section: Reputations Dimensions and Rolesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Earlier studies, however, show that the reputations of important core members that are affiliated to an organization, such as CEOs (D'Aveni 1990; Gulati 2003, 2006;Cohen and Dean 2005) or other board members (Certo 2003;Musteen et al 2010), can also have an impact on the reputation of the firm as a whole. In addition, the composition (Deutsch and Ross 2003) of the board and the background (Beckman et al 2007;Beckman and Burton 2008) of the top management team or individual entrepreneur (Hsu 2007) of a new firm has a significant effect on the behavior of investors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects of having more than one good reputation on distributor investments in the film industry

Ebbers

Wijnberg

2012

J Cult Econ

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Reputations of organizations and its individual members are valuable resources that help new organizations to get access to investment capital. Reputations, however, can have different dimensions. In this paper, we argue that an individual's reputation along a particular dimension will have a positive effect on the behavior of investors when it is role congruent. In addition, we argue that also scoring favorably on the role-incongruent dimension at the same time-or, in other words, engaging in reputational category spanning-will weaken the positive effect of the role-congruent reputation. Our empirical setting is the film industry where we study the effect of the two main dimensions of reputation in cultural industries, artistic and commercial, of both directors and producers on the size of the investment by distributors. In this study, artistic reputation is based on professional critics' reviews and commercial reputation on box office performance of the films in which individuals were involved in the past. We find that the commercial reputation of a film producer based on past box office performance has a positive effect on the size of the investment by film distributors. In addition, we find that directors who at the same time combine both a favorable commercial as well as an artistic reputation actually receive a lower investment from film distributors.

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You are Known by the Directors You Keep: Reputable Directors as a Signaling Mechanism for Young Firms

Cited by 137 publications

References 39 publications

Corporate board failure in Zimbabwe: Have non – executive directors gone to sleep?

Corporate board failure in Zimbabwe: Have non – executive directors gone to sleep?

Corporate governance in newly listed companies

The effects of having more than one good reputation on distributor investments in the film industry

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