Yet another new cosmological argument

Weaver, Christopher Gregory

doi:10.1007/s11153-015-9534-1

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…The first contingent thing to exist is possibly caused to exist (Rasmussen, 2011; Turri, 2011). An event that includes all and only contingent substances possibly has a cause (Rasmussen, 2010; Rasmussen & Weaver, 2018; Weaver, 2016). Its beginning to be the case that there are contingent things possibly has a cause (Pruss & Rasmussen, 2018; Rasmussen, 2010).…”

Section: Cosmological Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Recent Work on Traditional Arguments for Theism I

McIntosh

2022

Philosophy Compass

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Section: Cosmological Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…• An event that includes all and only contingent substances possibly has a cause (Rasmussen, 2010;Rasmussen & Weaver, 2018;Weaver, 2016).…”

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confidence: 99%

Recent Work on Traditional Arguments for Theism I

McIntosh

2022

Philosophy Compass

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What the First Cause Is

Loke

2022

The Teleological and Kalam Cosmological Arguments Revisited

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I show that the First Cause is not a series of changes (= events) describable by physical laws; rather, it is initially changeless and brought about the first event with the physical laws. It is distinct from the physical universe which is constantly changing according to quantum physics, and which does not have ‘the capacity to be the originator of an event in a way that is un-determined by prior event, and the capacity to prevent itself from changing’, which a First Cause must have. Thus, the First Cause cannot be part of the physical universe as postulated by Hawking’s no boundary proposal, which in any case is unproven and scientifically flawed. Rather, the First Cause is uncaused, beginningless, initially changeless, has libertarian freedom, and is enormously powerful, that is, a transcendent immaterial Creator. I reply to Thomistic objections and show that the conclusion of the Kalām Cosmological Argument (KCA) and the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo are consistent with both relational and substantival views of time, and with dynamic and static theories of time, and with both Craig’s Hybrid view (the First Cause is timeless sans creation and in time with creation) and the view of the Oxford School, both of which are defensible.

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Why does God exist?

McIntosh

2020

Rel. Stud.

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Many philosophers have appealed to the PSR in arguments for a being that exists a se, a being whose explanation is in itself. But what does it mean, exactly, for something to have its explanation ‘in itself’? Contemporary philosophers have said next to nothing about this, relying instead on phrases plucked from the accounts of various historical figures. In this article, I analyse five such accounts – those of Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz – and argue that none are satisfactory. Should we abandon or restrict the PSR, then? I think that would be hasty, for many reasons. I therefore consider the prospects of explaining everything, including God, given the constraints of certain features of good explanations, and conclude with several observations about future approaches.

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Yet another new cosmological argument

Cited by 3 publications

References 56 publications

Recent Work on Traditional Arguments for Theism I

Recent Work on Traditional Arguments for Theism I

What the First Cause Is

Why does God exist?

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