XIV—Ontological Dependence

Fine, Kit

doi:10.1093/aristotelian/95.1.269

Cited by 357 publications

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“…e.g., Fine 1995;Schaffer 2009;Clark and Liggins 2012;Raven 2013). Contrary to what one might perhaps think, to hold this view does not require that every (metaphysical) explanation we in fact give says that the relation it picks out is grounding.…”

Section: Explanation-aptnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grounding and metaphysical explanation: it’s complicated

Maurin

2018

Philos Stud

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Grounding theorists insist that grounding and explanation are intimately related. This claim could be understood as saying either that grounding 'inherits' its properties from (metaphysical) explanation (and that, therefore, contemplating the nature of explanation informs us about the nature of grounding) or it could be interpreted as saying that grounding plays an important-possibly an indispensablerole in metaphysical explanation (and that, therefore, that there are these explanations justifies positing grounding). Or both. I argue that saying that grounding 'inherits' its properties from explanation can only be justified if grounding is explanatory by nature (if so-called 'unionism' is true), but that this view is untenable. We ought therefore to be 'separatists' and view grounding and explanation as distinct. As it turns out, though, once grounding has been in this sense distinguished from the explanation it backs, the view that the role grounding plays in explanation justifies its introduction ends up in serious trouble. I conclude that the role grounding plays in explanation (if any) does not justify attributing to grounding whatever nature we think it has, and it most likely does not give us any special reason to think grounding exists.

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Section: Explanation-aptnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grounding and metaphysical explanation: it’s complicated

Maurin

2018

Philos Stud

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“…Fine 1982 andCorreia 2008). To use a common example from Fine, it is held that the singleton set {Socrates} is explained by the existence of Socrates because the singleton set is ontologically (i.e., essentially) dependent on Socrates (but not vice versa: see Fine, 1995). In short, then, positing explanatory relations which run from the dependers to the dependees is to posit a relation running in the wrong direction.…”

Section: The One Over Many Problem and Armstrong's World Of States Ofmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To say that one thing (call it x) depends in a purely modal sense upon another (y) is to say that necessarily, if x then y. Fine (1995) argues, however, that there are many cases in which the purely modal construal of dependence is insufficient for capturing the ontological dependence involved. For instance, strictly speaking Socrates is modally dependent on his singleton set, but surely Socrates is not ontologically dependent on his singleton set; rather, the set depends for its existence on Socrates and not vice versa.…”

Section: The One Over Many Problem and The Platonic View Of Universalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…An explanation of the basic idea suffices for current purposes. For further details, interested readers should see Correia 2005, Fine 1995and Lowe 1998. Note that although Lowe's notion of ontological dependence is similar to Fine's notion of essential dependence (Lowe 1998, 149), Lowe prefers to cash it out using the notion of identity rather than essence.…”

Section: The One Over Many Problem and The Platonic View Of Universalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mirage Realism Revisited

Tugby¹

2016

Metaphysics and Scientific Realism

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The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. Armstrong's theory of immanent universals has undergone a number of developments, and it is time to reassess the one over many problem in the light of those developments. I argue that a stronger case than ever can be made for thinking that Armstrong ought not to take the one over many problem seriously.However, all is not lost for realists about universals who think the one over many problem should be taken seriously. I argue that, unlike Armstrongian immanent realists, Platonic realists about universals need not be mirage realists.

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“…In Agent-UML a role is related to a group The dependence of a role from another entity is not contingent, but it rests in the definition itself of the role. For this reason, (Fine, 1995) introduces the following notion of dependence: "to say that an object x depends upon an F is to say that an F will be ineliminably involved in any definition of x". This notion is elaborated by into the notion of definitional dependence: e.g., the definition of the concept of student makes reference not to a specific school but to the concept of school, the employee to the concept of organization, the director to the concept of department, the president to the concept of state, etc.…”

Section: Definitional Dependencementioning

confidence: 99%

A Replanning Algorithm for Decision Theoretic Hierarchical Planning: Principles and Empirical Evaluation

Boella

Damiano

2008

Applied Artificial Intelligence

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In this paper, we present a replanning algorithm for a decision-theoretic hierarchical planner, and illustrate the experimental methodology we designed to investigate its performance. The methodology relies on an agentbased framework, in which plan failures emerge from the interplay of the agent and the environment. Given this framework, the replanning algorithm is compared with planning from scratch by executing experiments in different domains. The empirical evaluation shows the superiority of replanning with respect from planning from scratch. However, the observation of significant differences in the data collected across planning domains confirm the importance of empirical evaluation in practical systems.

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XIV—Ontological Dependence

Cited by 357 publications

References 0 publications

Grounding and metaphysical explanation: it’s complicated

Grounding and metaphysical explanation: it’s complicated

Mirage Realism Revisited

A Replanning Algorithm for Decision Theoretic Hierarchical Planning: Principles and Empirical Evaluation

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