XII—The Distinction in Kind between Knowledge and Belief

Antognazza, Maria Rosa

doi:10.1093/arisoc/aoaa013

Cited by 13 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Doxa is “unenlightened state of mind which takes sensible appearances and current moral notions at their face value” (Plato, 1944 : 217). It is not only a downgraded knowledge; it presupposes a certain mental state or even a mindset (Antognazza, 2020 : 277; 282f.). Doxa is connected to the unreasonable part of the soul and divided into eikasia and pistis .…”

Section: Non-reasonable Trust: Trust In Other Epistemic Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Migrations of Trust: Reasonable Trust and Epistemic Transgressions

Franeta¹

2022

Hum Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Despite an immense amount of literature on the topic of trust, there is still no account that offers a plausible epistemological framework for the phenomenon of reasonable trust. The main claim of this article is that reasonable trust and distrust are phenomena based upon practical knowledge, while non-reasonable trust and distrust result from dislocation of trust into different epistemic regimes. This dislocation can be observed in some of the influential theories such as cognitive and emotional accounts of trust and in the accounts understanding trust as a form of faith. Added to that, theoretical approaches introducing a strong idea of basic trust preclude observing the difference between reasonable and non-reasonable trust. In this article, I argue that reasonable trust is founded upon practical knowledge which includes knowledge of integrity of the trusted person and knowledge about a similarity of worldviews of the trust giver and the trust receiver. Furthermore, I elaborate on the ways reasonable trust and distrust are being transformed and disfigured in other epistemic regimes. Drawing mainly upon Aristotelian understanding of practical knowledge, I want to show how non-reasonable trust and distrust are manifested in the phenomena of blind trust, unconditional trust and absolute doubt and explain why non-reasonable trust and distrust can hardly be distinguished from loyalty, subordination, infatuation or calculation.

show abstract

Section: Non-reasonable Trust: Trust In Other Epistemic Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Migrations of Trust: Reasonable Trust and Epistemic Transgressions

Franeta¹

2022

Hum Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…One way to pursue this proposal, suggested by Helen Wodehouse (1908Wodehouse ( , 1909Wodehouse ( , 1910, a contemporary of Cook Wilson's, is to try to define knowing as a form of consciousness with the differentiating characteristic of "presenting reality". (Recent variants of this proposal can be found in Antognazza (2020), Ayers (2019), Zagzebski (2017), although the first two put them forward as connective rather than reductive definitions. )…”

Section: Two Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cook Wilson on knowledge and forms of thinking

Longworth

Wimmer

2022

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

John Cook Wilson is an important predecessor of contemporary knowledge first epistemologists: among other parallels, he claimed that knowledge is indefinable. We reconstruct four arguments for this claim discernible in his work, three of which find no clear analogues in contemporary discussions of knowledge first epistemology. We pay special attention to Cook Wilson’s view of the relation between knowledge and forms of thinking (like belief). Claims of Cook Wilson’s that support the indefinability of knowledge include: that knowledge, unlike belief, straddles an active/passive divide; that, rather than entailing belief, knowledge excludes belief; and that understanding forms of thinking other than knowledge (such as belief) depends on understanding knowledge. Reflecting on Cook Wilson’s framework highlights underappreciated concerns relevant to any attempt to define knowledge.

show abstract

“…11.See Price (1935), Antognazza (2015, 165–172), Idem (2021), and Climenhaga (Forthcoming). For a historical overview of this view of knowledge, see Ayers and Antognazza (2019).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Probing the mind of God: divine beliefs and credences

Jackson¹,

Mooney²

2021

Rel. Stud.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Although much has been written about divine knowledge, and some on divine beliefs, virtually nothing has been written about divine credences. In this article we comparatively assess four views on divine credences: (1) God has only beliefs, not credences; (2) God has both beliefs and credences; (3) God has only credences, not beliefs; and (4) God has neither credences nor beliefs, only knowledge. We weigh the costs and benefits of these four views and draw connections to current discussions in philosophical theology.

show abstract

XII—The Distinction in Kind between Knowledge and Belief

Cited by 13 publications

References 21 publications

Migrations of Trust: Reasonable Trust and Epistemic Transgressions

Migrations of Trust: Reasonable Trust and Epistemic Transgressions

Cook Wilson on knowledge and forms of thinking

Probing the mind of God: divine beliefs and credences

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About