Worldly Indeterminacy: A Rough Guide

Rosen, Gideon; Smith, Nicholas J. J.

doi:10.1080/713659795

Cited by 75 publications

(18 citation statements)

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“…22 Akiba (2000Akiba ( , 2004, Barnes (2010), Burgess (1990), Hawley (2002), Heck (1998), Lowe (1999), Morreau (2002), Noonan (2004), Paganini (2011), Tye (1990), Williams (2008aWilliams ( , 2008b. Rosen and Smith (2004) is compatible with concessivism but does not explicitly endorse it. 23 See Johnston (1992) and Lowe (1995).…”

Section: Ramificationsmentioning

confidence: 92%

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Indeterminate Comprehension

Simon

2014

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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Can we solve the Problem of the Many, and give a general account of the indeterminacy in definite descriptions that give rise to it, by appealing to metaphysically indeterminate entities? I argue that we cannot. I identify a feature common to the relevant class of definite descriptions, and derive a contradiction from the claim that each such description is satisfied by a metaphysically indeterminate entity.

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Section: Ramificationsmentioning

confidence: 92%

“… Akiba (, ), Barnes (), Burgess (), Hawley (), Heck (), Lowe (), Morreau (), Noonan (), Paganini (), Tye (), Williams (2008a, 2008b). Rosen and Smith () is compatible with concessivism but does not explicitly endorse it. …”

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confidence: 99%

Indeterminate Comprehension

Simon

2014

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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“…Transforming constraining affordances into information need not be a metaphysically violent business (as Bacon thought it might), if reality in itself is indeed indeterminate (Rosen and Smith [2004]) or if we are ready to be led by it insofar as it is determinate. From this perspective, semantic concerns (most importantly reference, representation and truth 25 ) belong to the relation among models, that is, among outcomes of LoAs (Kant's phenomenal world of experience), not to the relation between models and reality in itself.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A defence of informational structural realism

Floridi

2007

Synthese

139

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Synthese (Springer)Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. It is a publisher's requirement to display the following notice:The documents distributed by this server have been provided by the contributing authors as a means to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly and technical work on a noncommercial basis. Copyright and all rights therein are maintained by the authors or by other copyright holders, notwithstanding that they have offered their works here electronically. It is understood that all persons copying this information will adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright. These works may not be reposted without the explicit permission of the copyright holder.In the case of Springer, it is the publisher's requirement that the following note be added: shown that, within the debate about structural realism (SR), epistemic (ESR) and ontic (OSR) structural realism are reconcilable. It follows that a version of OSR is defensible from a structuralist-friendly position. Second, it is argued that a version of OSR is also plausible, because not all relata (structured entities) are logically prior to relations (structures). Third, it is shown that a version of OSR is also applicable to both sub-observable (unobservable and instrumentally-only observable) and observable entities, by developing its ontology of structural objects in terms of informational objects. The outcome is informational structural realism, a version of OSR supporting the ontological commitment to a view of the world as the totality of informational objects dynamically interacting with each other. The paper has been discussed by several colleagues and, in the second half, ten objections that have been moved to the proposal are answered in order to clarify it further. KeywordsEpistemic structural realism; informational ontology; levels of abstraction; ontic structural realism; structural realism.

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“…17 For a detailed discussion of the distinction between semantic and worldly predicate vagueness, see (Smith, 2001) and (Rosen and Smith, 2004). Briefly, the idea is that a predicate 'F ' is semantically vague if it fails to pick out a unique property, but rather refers ambiguously to many properties at once, each of these properties being sharp -that is, such that any object either possesses the property simpliciter or fails to possess it simpliciter.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vagueness and Blurry Sets

Smith

2004

Journal of Philosophical Logic

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ABSTRACT. This paper presents a new theory of vagueness, which is designed to retain the virtues of the fuzzy theory, while avoiding the problem of higher-order vagueness. The theory presented here accommodates the idea that for any statement S 1 to the effect that 'Bob is bald' is x true, for x in [0, 1], there should be a further statement S 2 which tells us how true S 1 is, and so on -that is, it accommodates higher-order vaguenesswithout resorting to the claim that the metalanguage in which the semantics of vagueness is presented is itself vague, and without requiring us to abandon the idea that the logic -as opposed to the semantics -of vague discourse is classical. I model the extension of a vague predicate P as a blurry set, this being a function which assigns a degree of membership or degree function to each object o, where a degree function in turn assigns an element of [0, 1] to each finite sequence of elements of [0, 1]. The idea is that the assignment to the sequence 0.3, 0.2 , for example, represents the degree to which it is true to say that it is 0.2 true that o is P to degree 0.3. The philosophical merits of my theory are discussed in detail, and the theory is compared with other extensions and generalisations of fuzzy logic in the literature.

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Worldly Indeterminacy: A Rough Guide

Cited by 75 publications

References 1 publication

Indeterminate Comprehension

Indeterminate Comprehension

A defence of informational structural realism

Vagueness and Blurry Sets

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