World Bank technical assistance: Locating and cultivating sympathetic interlocutors

Abstract

International development agencies have need of sympathetic interlocutors in developing countries who are receptive to and capable of sustainably implementing global policy norms. This article analyses World Bank technical assistance (TA) as a tool used to stack the policy deck in its favour by identifying and cultivating those government officials receptive to its ideas. Pairing its analysis with the policy mobilities literature, the article considers two questions: how does the World Bank locate receptive actors and how does it socialize new actors into accepting its ideas and practices? Observing the World Bank's four main TA pillars, the article reviews the different strengths and weaknesses of these pillars in garnering domestic support. In critiquing the World Bank's attempts to identify and cultivate sympathetic interlocutors, the article provides new insights into the mechanisms that facilitate the transnational movement of policy.

Managing performance and winning trust: how World Bank staff shape recipient performance

“…It is derived from ideational perspectives on compliance (Checkel 1997;Simmons 2013). In the literature on International Financial Institutions, these perspectives have been discussed under the label of sympathetic interlocutors (Arpac and Bird 2009;Bazbauers 2019;Heinzel et al 2020;Woods 2006). According to Woods (2006, p. 10), sympathetic interlocutors are understood as actors that are "both willing and able to embrace the priorities preferred by the institutions."…”

“…Woods (2006) argues that the International Financial Institutions need to identify existing sympathetic interlocutors inside the national bureaucracy or persuade interlocutors to increase their commitment to reform. These two means of cultivation are further specified by Bazbauers (2019). To identify sympathetic interlocutors, the World Bank staff can either locate them through their public support for programs or based on their relationships built through prior engagements.…”

“…Alternatively, World Bank staff can seek to persuade interlocutors of the importance of the project. Persuasion can work through direct interaction or by mobilizing already existing interlocutors (Bazbauers 2019).…”

“…Several studies on development projects have pointed to the importance of trust and communication between national and international implementation staff. These authors argue that when recipients trust World Bank staff, they will be more open to dialogue and persuasion, and be more inclined to adhere to their obligation in a project (Bazbauers 2019;Ika et al 2012;Lannon and Walsh 2020). Indeed, research on social trust shows that trust renders policy recommendations more credible and leads to actors being more receptive to external advice and criticism (Keefer and Knack 2008).…”

How does the World Bank Influence the Development Policy Priorities of Low-Income and Lower-Middle Income Countries ?

“…This blind spot in the literature has prompted some theorization about the conditions under which-and the mechanisms through which-ideas might matter (Meseguer 2006 (Momani 2005;Chwieroth 2007Chwieroth , 2009Chwieroth , 2010Chwieroth , 2012Kahler 1992;Corrales 2006;Nelson 2014;Bazbauers 2019 This argument enjoys some empirical support. In a wide-ranging review of conditional contracts between IFIs and developing countries, Kahler (1992: 127) , Fayyad "[was] the Palestinian figure with the most prestige in the West; they consider[ed] him to be someone who can speak their language" (Ravid 2007).…”