Works Councils: Barriers or Boosts for the Competitiveness of German Firms?

Sadowski, Dieter; Backes‐Gellner, Uschi; Frick, Bernd

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8543.1995.tb00449.x

Cited by 56 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…In addition, there is some evidence that works councils reduce labour turnover (Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 2001) and separations (Frick 1996), while they enhance the employment duration of blue collar male workers (Boockmann and Steffes 2010). Moreover, Sadowski, Backes-Gellner and Frick (1995) and Frick (1996) find that the existence of a works council reduces dismissals; a claim disputed in Kraft's (2006) replication study. Hirsch, Schank and Schnabel (2010) report that a works council reduces the separation rate, particularly for men.…”

mentioning

confidence: 79%

Trade union membership and dismissals

Goerke

Pannenberg

2011

Labour Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This series presents research findings based either directly on data from the German SocioEconomic Panel Study (SOEP) or using SOEP data as part of an internationally comparable data set (e.g. CNEF, ECHP, LIS, LWS, CHER/PACO). SOEP is a truly multidisciplinary household panel study covering a wide range of social and behavioral sciences: economics, sociology, psychology, survey methodology, econometrics and applied statistics, educational science, political science, public health, behavioral genetics, demography, geography, and sport science. Terms of use: Documents inThe decision to publish a submission in SOEPpapers is made by a board of editors chosen by the DIW Berlin to represent the wide range of disciplines covered by SOEP. There is no external referee process and papers are either accepted or rejected without revision. Papers appear in this series as works in progress and may also appear elsewhere. They often represent preliminary studies and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be requested from the author directly. AbstractIn Germany, there is no trade union membership wage premium, while the membership fee amounts to 1% of the gross wage. Therefore, prima facie, there are strong incentives to freeride on the benefits of trade unionism. We establish empirical evidence for a private gain from trade union membership which has hitherto not been documented: in West Germany, union members are less likely to lose their jobs than non-members. In particular, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel we can show that roughly 50% of the observed raw differential in individual dismissal rates can be explained by the estimated average partial effect of union membership.JEL Classification: C 23, H 41, J 51, J 63

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confidence: 79%

Trade union membership and dismissals

Goerke

Pannenberg

2011

Labour Economics

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“…Over the last decade several empirical studies have shown that works councillors hardly use these rights (for a review of this literature see Auer, 1994;Breisig, 1993, pp. 15-18;Grass, 1997;Sadowski, Backes-Gellner and Frick, 1995). Nevertheless, we came across several examples where employee representatives have influenced training policies.…”

Section: Trainingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human Resource Management under Institutional Constraints: The Case of Germany

Müller

1999

British J of Management

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Most human resource management (HRM) research has been conducted in countries that have relatively weak labour market institutions such as the UK and the USA. There is little research about the scope for and constraints on the adoption of HRM practices in countries with strong statutory regulations. The research presented here is based on 16 case studies of banks and chemical firms operating in Germany, that comply with the requirements of the German labour market institutions of collective bargaining, co‐determination and initial vocational training, and hence operate under strong institutional constraints. The evidence presented shows that institutional features of the German system encourage the implementation of some ingredients of the HRM ‘recipe’ and inhibit others. It also indicates that constraining influences notwithstanding, a pluralist version of HRM appears to be quite compatible with the highly regulated German context.

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“…Since work councils have a strong position as workers' representatives in issues related to employment and working hours, it is likely the case that work councils also have differential effects on firms' employment policies. Sadowski et al (1995) find that the existence of work councils leads to less labour turnover within firms. Second, labour lawyers often point at the legal flexibility potentials already available in collective wage contracts (see Rieble, 1996).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 85%

“…Both types of costs can be influenced by economic factors, for example rising energy prices or changes in the skill composition of labour supply, and institutional arrangements like collective wage agreements, employment protection laws or work councils. In Germany, workers can be represented by a work council at the firm level and by unions at the sector level, which has been called the "duality of workers representation" (see Sadowski et al, 1995). While work councils have a strong legal position with respect to dismissals and hours of work, collective wage agreements (bargained between unions and employer's associations or unions and single firms) have, however, a legal priority over plant-level arrangements (bargained between work councils and firms or between workers and firms) (see Rieble, 1996).…”

Section: Economic and Institutional Adjustment Costsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A shortcoming of most of the existing studies on the relationship between labour market institutions and employment is that they focus on the sector level although the firm is the place where hiring and firing decisions actually take place. 2 An exception, however, is the contribution by Sadowski et al (1995) who analyse the effect of the work councils on the competitiveness of German firms. The authors find that job turnover and dismissals are lower in firms where workers are represented by work councils than in firms where a work council does not exist.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Collective Wage Agreements and Adjustments in German Services Firms

Kaiser

Pfeiffer

2003

SSRN Journal

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Die Discussion Papers dienen einer möglichst schnellen Verbreitung von neueren Forschungsarbeiten des ZEW. Die Beiträge liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung der Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die Meinung des ZEW dar.Discussion Papers are intended to make results of ZEW research promptly available to other economists in order to encourage discussion and suggestions for revisions. The authors are solely responsible for the contents which do not necessarily represent the opinion of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp0033.pdf Collective Wage Agreements and Adjustments in German Services FirmsULRICH KAISER* and FRIEDHELM PFEIFFER** August 2000 Abstract:There is a growing concern about collective wage agreement and employment dynamics in Germany. In this paper, evidence is provided on the way collective wage agreements affect the adjustment of working hours, employment and other production factors when firms from the service sector are faced with demand shocks. The estimation results indicate that collective wage agreements significantly influence firms' employment policies. Enrolments and the employment of free-lance collaborators are negatively affected while the probability of using short-term employment contracts as a reaction to demand shocks is positively influenced. No significant effect on the probability of dismissing workers has been found. JEL classification: C33, J30, J50 Keywords: collective wage agreements, demand fluctuations and adjustment costs, random effects ordered probit model, business-related services.

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Works Councils: Barriers or Boosts for the Competitiveness of German Firms?

Cited by 56 publications

References 23 publications

Trade union membership and dismissals

Trade union membership and dismissals

Human Resource Management under Institutional Constraints: The Case of Germany

Collective Wage Agreements and Adjustments in German Services Firms

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