Working memory capacity and dual-task interference in picture naming

Abstract

Researchers have found no agreement on whether dual-task interference in language performance, such as dual-task interference from tone discrimination on picture naming, reflects passive queuing or active scheduling of processes for each task. According to a passive-queuing account, while a central response-selection bottleneck is occupied by the tone discrimination task, picture naming is held in a passive queue until the bottleneck is freed. In contrast, according to an active-scheduling account, participants determine the order in which the tasks proceed, monitor progress on the tasks, suspend picture naming and hold it in working memory, and determine when to resume picture naming. Here, we report a study that assessed the relative merits of the queuing and scheduling accounts by examining whether the magnitude of dual-task interference in picture naming is associated with individual differences in the capacity of monitoring and updating of working memory representations, as assessed by the operation-span task. We observed that the updating/monitoring ability correlated with the speed of picture naming and with the magnitude of the interference from tone discrimination on picture naming. These results lend support to the active-scheduling account of dual-task interference in picture naming.

Locus of semantic interference in picture naming: Evidence from dual-task performance.

“…Thus, Schnur and Martin obtained additive effects of SOA and stimulus type, compatible with Figure 1B. Furthermore, Piai and Roelofs (2013) also failed to replicate the underadditivity of stimulus type and SOA effects using the SOAs Figure 1. Schematic illustration of a lexical response-selection bottleneck account of the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) effect on semantic interference in dual-task performance.…”

“…Stimulus type and paradigm interacted, F 1 (2, 30) ϭ 7.46, p ϭ .002, indicating that the interference effects for the Stroop paradigm were larger than the Stroop-like effects in PWI. Importantly, the Stroop-like effects for the PWI task were significant, incongruent vs. congruent, t 1 (15) ϭ 5.50, p Ͻ .001, 95% confidence interval (CI) [55,128] Schnur and Martin (2012) and Piai and Roelofs (2013) observed for the semantic interference effect, but it differs from what Ayora et al (2011), Dell'Acqua et al (2007, and van Maanen et al (2012, Experiment 1) observed. The additivity of the effects of stimulus type and SOA suggests that the effects occurred at the response-selection stage or later (see Figure 1B), in disagreement with the proposal of a pre-selection locus by Dell'Acqua et al Moreover, given that all written words were phonologically regular, the findings do not agree with the account of Kleinman (2013).…”

“…The experiments of Ayora et al (2011), Dell'Acqua et al (2007, Fagot and Pashler (1992, Experiment 7), Kleinman (2013), Schnur and Martin (2012), Roelofs (2013), andvan Maanen et al (2012) differ in several respects, including tasks, materials, SOAs, and stimulus types. The aim of the experiments reported in the present article was to examine whether any of these factors could have contributed to the difference in results between the earlier studies.…”

“…In Fagot and Pashler's (1992) study, the distractor words corresponded to responses in the experiment, whereas that was not the case in the studies of Ayora et al (2011), Dell'Acqua et al (2007, Kleinman (2013), Schnur andMartin (2012), andvan Maanen et al (2012). Moreover, the number of tones used also differed among studies: two tones in Fagot and Pashler (Experiment 7) and Piai and Roelofs (2013) Ayora et al, 2011). In order to allow for an easy comparison of the properties of the present experiments with those published in the literature, Table 1 gives an overview over the communalities and differences of the published experiments and of all experiments of the present article.…”

“…According to one alternative account, dual-task interference arises because response-selection processes require central attentional capacity, which may be shared between tasks (Tombu & Jolicoeur, 2003). However, this account predicts additive effects of Task 2 response-selection manipulations and SOA (for extensive discussion, see Tombu & Jolicoeur, 2003), and therefore cannot explain why some studies obtained additive effects (Piai & Roelofs, 2013;Schnur & Martin, 2012) and other studies observed underadditive effects (Ayora et al, 2011;Dell'Acqua et al, 2007;van Maanen et al, 2012, Experiment 1). According to another alternative account, the locus of the bottleneck is strategically determined (e.g., Hübner & Lehle, 2007;Israel & Cohen, 2011;Lehle & Hübner, 2009;Leonhard & Ulrich, 2011;Logan & Gordon, 2001;Meyer & Kieras, 1997; but see Ruthruff, Johnston, & Remington, 2009;Ruthruff, Pashler, & Klaassen, 2001), rather than structural and immutable, as argued by Dell'Acqua et al (2007) and Pashler (1984Pashler ( , 1994.…”