We argue that attention and awareness form the basis of one type of working-memory storage. In contrast to models of working memory in which storage and retrieval occur effortlessly, we document that an attention-demanding goal conflict within a retrieval cue impairs recall from working memory. In a conceptual span task, semantic and color-name cues prompted recall of four consecutive words from a twelve-word list. The first-, middle-, and final-four words belonged to different semantic categories (e.g., body parts, animals, and tools) and were shown in different colors (e.g., red, blue, and green). In Experiment 1, the color of the cue matched that of cued items 75% of the time, and the rare mismatch impaired recall. In Experiment 2, though, the color of the cue matched that of the cued items only 25% of the time, and the now-more-frequent mismatches no longer mattered. These results are difficult to explain with passive storage alone and indicate that a processing difficulty impedes recall from working memory, presumably by distracting attention away from its storage function.What is the relation between immediate memory and conscious awareness? William James (1890) described primary memory as "the trailing edge of the conscious present." (Related statements by an early experimental psychologist, Wilhelm Wundt, apparently were never translated into English and would be better described by a German psychologist.) Whereas the trailing-edge description might leave the impression that primary memory serves no important purpose in behavior, in a slight re-conceptualization it can be equated with working memory, the small amount of information that is readily accessible (in contrast to the vast storehouse of long-term memory, which can be accessed only slowly and less surely). Working memory acquired its name because it presumably serves the important function of making available the data needed to carry out cognitive tasks such as comprehension, linguistic planning, and problem-solving (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Logie, 1999). Combining James with more recent work, the information readily accessible to the human mind may have both experiential and behavioral facets.One cannot assume, though, that the mechanisms of working-memory storage and the contents of conscious awareness are one and the same. To the extent that storage is accomplished through a general mechanism that can be shared between disparate types of information and is limited in its capacity (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968), it is the kind of storage mechanism that presumably could qualify as the contents of awareness (Baars, 1988(Baars, , 2001Cowan, 1988 Cowan, , 1995 Cowan, , 1999Cowan, , 2001. However, theoretical descriptions of working memory also have included mechanisms that do not fit this description. Proposed mechanisms of this sort have included a large-capacity, short-lived sensory memory (e.g., Broadbent, 1958; Cowan, 1995), code-specific phonological and visuo-spatial buffers (e.g., Baddeley & Logie, 1999), and activated feat...