Working dogs cooperate among one another by generalised reciprocity

Gfrerer, Nastassja; Taborsky, Michael

doi:10.1038/srep43867

Cited by 38 publications

(57 citation statements)

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“…communication) systems. These observations are complemented with convincing empirical evidence suggesting the possibility that such a mechanism may have indeed emerged in natural systems by evolution [22,23,[25][26][27].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 77%

Cooperation dynamics of generalized reciprocity in state-based social dilemmas

et al. 2018

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We introduce a framework for studying social dilemmas in networked societies where individuals follow a simple state-based behavioral mechanism based on generalized reciprocity, which is rooted in the principle "help anyone if helped by someone." Within this general framework, which applies to a wide range of social dilemmas including, among others, public goods, donation, and snowdrift games, we study the cooperation dynamics on a variety of complex network examples. By interpreting the studied model through the lenses of nonlinear dynamical systems, we show that cooperation through generalized reciprocity always emerges as the unique attractor in which the overall level of cooperation is maximized, while simultaneously exploitation of the participating individuals is prevented. The analysis elucidates the role of the network structure, here captured by a local centrality measure which uniquely quantifies the propensity of the network structure to cooperation by dictating the degree of cooperation displayed both at the microscopic and macroscopic level. We demonstrate the applicability of the analysis on a practical example by considering an interaction structure that couples a donation process with a public goods game.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 77%

Cooperation dynamics of generalized reciprocity in state-based social dilemmas

et al. 2018

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“…A driving force of evolution of generalized reciprocity is assortment of cooperative strategies (Rankin and Taborsky, 2009) based on contingent movement of individuals between groups (Hamilton and Taborsky, 2005), a small group size (Pfeiffer et al, 2005) (but see Barta et al (2011), where random drift helps generalized reciprocity to overcome initial disadvantage in a large group), or network structure (van Doorn and Taborsky, 2012). Generalized reciprocity has been proposed as a mechanism that does not require high cognitive ability, and hence is applicable to cooperation by non-human animals (Rutte and Taborsky, 2007;Schneeberger et al, 2012;Leimgruber et al, 2014;Gfrerer and Taborsky, 2017) as well as empathy-based cooperation by humans (Bartlett and DeSteno, 2006;Stanca, 2009). In contrast, a driving force of cooperation in my model is coordination of behavior based on negotiation and pre-commitments.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Dynamics of Coordinated Cooperation

Ohtsuki

2018

Front. Ecol. Evol.

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In social evolution theory, unconditional cooperation has been seen as an evolutionarily unsuccessful strategy unless there is a mechanism that promotes positive assortment between like individuals. One such example is kin selection, where individuals sharing common ancestry and therefore having the same strategy are more likely to interact with each other. Conditional cooperation, on the other hand, can be successful if interactions with the same partners last long. In many previous models, it has been assumed that individuals act conditionally on the past behavior of others. Here I propose a new model of conditional cooperation, namely the model of coordinated cooperation. Coordinated cooperation means that there is a negotiation before an actual game is played, and that each individual can flexibly change their decision, either to cooperation or to defection, according to the number of those who show the intention of cooperation/defection. A notable feature of my model is that individuals play an actual game only once but can still use conditional strategies. Since such a negotiation is cognitively demanding, the target of my model here is exclusively human behavior. I have analyzed cultural evolutionary dynamics of conditional strategies in this framework. Results for an infinitely large population show that conditional cooperation not only works as a catalyst for the evolution of cooperation, but sustains a polymorphic attractor with unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and conditional cooperators being present. A finite population analysis is also performed. Overall, my results provide one explanation of why people tend to take into account others' decisions even when doing so gives them no payoff consequences at all.

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“…This may select for the application of simpler response strategies (e.g. generalized reciprocity; Barta, McNamara, Huszár, & Taborsky, ; Gfrerer & Taborsky, ; Leimgruber et al, ; Pfeiffer, Rutte, Killingback, Taborsky, & Bonhoeffer, ; Rutte & Taborsky, ; Stanca, ; van Doorn & Taborsky, ).…”

Section: The Costs Of Processing Storing and Retrieving Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of sensory ecology and cognition in social decisions: Costs of acquiring information matter

Schneeberger

Taborsky

2020

Functional Ecology

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We generally assume that animals should maximize information acquisition about their environment to make prudent decisions. But this is a naïve assumption, as gaining information typically involves costs. This is especially so in the social context, where interests between interacting partners usually diverge. The arms race involved in mutual assessment is characterized by the attempt to obtain revealing information from a partner while providing only as much information by oneself as is conducive to one's own intentions. If obtaining information occasions costs in terms of time, energy and risk, animals should be selected to base their decisions on a cost–benefit ratio that takes account of the trade‐off between the risk of making wrong choices and the costs involved in information acquisition, processing and use. In addition, there may be physiological and/or environmental constraints limiting the ability to obtaining, processing and utilizing reliable information. Here, we discuss recent empirical evidence for the proposition that social decisions are to an important extent based on the costs that result from acquiring, processing, evaluating and storing information. Using examples from different taxa and ecological contexts, we aim at drawing attention to the often neglected costs of information recipience, with emphasis on the potential role of sensory ecology and cognition in social decisions.

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Working dogs cooperate among one another by generalised reciprocity

Cited by 38 publications

References 50 publications

Cooperation dynamics of generalized reciprocity in state-based social dilemmas

Cooperation dynamics of generalized reciprocity in state-based social dilemmas

Evolutionary Dynamics of Coordinated Cooperation

The role of sensory ecology and cognition in social decisions: Costs of acquiring information matter

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