Worker mobility in a search model with adverse selection

Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos; Kaas, Leo

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.10.003

Cited by 15 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…Carrillo-Tudela and Kaas (2015) show that similar dynamics occur in a model with adverse selection and on-thejob search.…”

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confidence: 64%

Work Histories and Lifetime Unemployment

Morchio

2020

Int Economic Review

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A long‐standing question in economics is how important unobserved differences across workers are for explaining unemployment. I revisit this topic using variation in lifetime unemployment across workers in U.S. data. A comparison of workers often unemployed with the rest shows that although differences in job‐finding rates increase over the course of a career, differences in job‐separation rates are large right from the start. I develop a directed search model with symmetric unobserved heterogeneity, in which agents learn workers' types from their labor market histories, to rationalize these findings. The model cannot match the data if unobserved heterogeneity is neglected.

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“…Carrillo-Tudela and Kaas (2015) show that similar dynamics occur in a model with adverse selection and on-thejob search.…”

mentioning

confidence: 64%

Work Histories and Lifetime Unemployment

Morchio

2020

Int Economic Review

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“…The next table presents the full set of estimated coefficients from the multinomial logit in Section 7, columns 2 and 4 from Table 6. The regression of equation (8) uses three categories for the dependent variable. Category 0 (baseline) represents no transition occurring during month t, category 1 represents a job-to-job transition occurring during month t and category 2 represents a job-to-unemployment transition occurring during month t.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Search capital

Carrillo-Tudela

Smith

2017

Review of Economic Dynamics

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This paper first documents the extent of return employment: workers returning to employers they worked for previously within the same employment spell. Employer returns are typically involuntary and lead to lower earnings. To understand these features, the paper then develops an equilibrium model of worker recall and on-the-job search in which job seekers hold onto information they acquire about job opportunities as insurance in the event of a job destruction shock. Allowing workers to recall contacts increases the probability of a jobto-job transition with the number of jobs previously held during the employment spell while the probability of an job-to-unemployment transition decreases. These transition patterns are consistent with empirical evidence.

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“…Other recent studies include Moen and Rosén () analyzing an efficiency wage contracting problem in a random search framework and Guerrieri et al. (2009) and Carrillo‐Tudela and Kaas () analyzing adverse selection problems.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By neglecting to consider these aspects, these studies preclude the interaction between the dynamic incentive problem and worker mobility in the labor market. Other recent studies include Moen and Rosén (2006) analyzing an efficiency wage contracting problem in a random search framework and Guerrieri et al (2009) and Carrillo-Tudela and Kaas (2015) analyzing adverse selection problems.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Contracts With Worker Mobility via Directed On‐the‐job Search

Tsuyuhara

2016

Int Economic Review

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This article proposes a model with dynamic incentive contracts and on‐the‐job search in a frictional labor market. The optimal long‐term contract exhibits an increasing wage–tenure profile. With increasing wages, worker effort also increases with tenure. These two features imply that the probabilities of both voluntary and involuntary job separation decrease with both job tenure and the duration of employment. Given these results, workers experience differing labor market transitions—between employment, unemployment, and across different employers—and the equilibrium generates endogenous heterogeneity among ex ante homogeneous workers.

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Worker mobility in a search model with adverse selection

Cited by 15 publications

References 41 publications

Work Histories and Lifetime Unemployment

Work Histories and Lifetime Unemployment

Search capital

Dynamic Contracts With Worker Mobility via Directed On‐the‐job Search

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