Worker Directors: A German Product that Did Not Export?

Abstract

Despite its seeming lack of attractiveness to other countries, the German system of quasi-parity codetermination at company level has held up fairly well. We recount the theoretical arguments for and against this form of codetermination, and survey the evolving empirical evidence on its economic impact. On both counts, employee representation on company boards might form part of the apparatus of good corporate governance, even if the extent of representation and the composition of the worker side are unsettled issues. Whatever the particular past merits of the case, however, the bottom line is that the recent availability of alternative forms of corporate governance will increasingly shape the German institution. Motivation

Ökonomische Wirkungen der Mitbestimmung in Deutschland: Ein Update

“…EinaktuellerÜberblickzudenökonomischenKonsequenzenderUnternehmensmitbestimmungfindetsichbei Addison/Schnabel(2009).AngesichtsdesimmensenTempos,mitdemneueUntersuchungengegenwärtigproduziertwerden,kannselbstdieserBeitragnichtdieneuestenStudienberücksichtigen. Addison(2009)bietet ebenfalls einen aktuellen -aber sehr selektiven -Überblick, der auch empirische Studien zu Betriebsräten berücksichtigt.…”

Board‐Level Employee Representation (BLER) and Firms’ Responses to Crisis

“…The economic consequences of employee participation in corporate decision making, particularly in the form of workers’ representation on the board of directors (board‐level employee representation [BLER]), have been given quite some attention in the academic literature (e.g., Addison and Schnabel ; Fauver and Fuerst ; Gorton and Schmid ; Jones ; Svejnar ). More recently, the public and academic debate about this characteristic of the employee–employer relationship has been gaining new momentum, with anecdotal evidence pointing to the relevance of employee–employer cooperation for swift adjustment to unfavorable economic conditions during the Great Recession (CEEMET ; Glassner, Keune, and Marginson ; Svalund et al.…”

Fairness in the Social Regulation of Labor Markets: Reasons for Hope?

“…For example, Germany continues to have worker representation on company supervisory boards (Addison and Schnabel 2011). Germany also has government-mandated works councils for all firms of more than 5 employees; France has works councils for firms of over 50 (Fairris and Askenazy 2010).…”