Worker demand for health insurance in the non-group market

Marquis, M. Susan; Long, Sharon K.

doi:10.1016/0167-6296(94)00035-3

Cited by 137 publications

(113 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Chernew, Cutler, and Keenan (2005) estimate that the elasticity of insurance take-up with respect to premiums is approximately -0.1, while Marquis and Long (1995) estimate an elasticity of -0.4. Elasticities inferred from survey data by Krueger and Kuziemko (2011), who discuss a variety of potential biases in the earlier empirical work, are much closer to -1.…”

Section: Discussion Of Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory Redistribution in the Market for Health Insurance

Clemens

2012

SSRN Journal

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In the early 1990s, several U.S. states enacted community rating regulations to equalize the private health insurance premiums paid by the healthy and the sick. Consistent with severe adverse selection pressures, I find that their private coverage rates fell by 8-11 percentage points more than rates in comparable markets over subsequent years. By the early 2000s, however, much of these losses had been recovered. The recoveries were coincident with substantial public insurance expansions (for unhealthy adults, pregnant women, and children) and were largest in the markets where public coverage of unhealthy adults expanded most. The analysis highlights an important linkage between the incidence of public insurance programs and redistributive regulations. When targeted at the sick, public insurance expansions can relieve the distortions associated with premium regulations, potentially crowding in private coverage. Such expansions will look particularly attractive to participants in community-rated insurance markets when a federal government shares in the cost of local public insurance programs.

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Section: Discussion Of Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory Redistribution in the Market for Health Insurance

Clemens

2012

SSRN Journal

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“…Estimates of price elasticities for health insurance are between 0 and -3, with the bulk between -0.5 and -1. 13 However, each elasticity estimate is valid only for a local range of coverage rates, and the much higher baseline ownership rates for health insurance (65-70 percent) make 13 One strand of literature examines the elasticity of insurance coverage (Gruber and Poterba (1994), Marquis and Long (1995), Chernew, Frick and McLaughlin (1997), Auerbach and Ohri (2006)). Because the primary channel of health insurance coverage is through the employer, several studies also examine the price elasticity of firms offering insurance (Feldman et al (1997), Marquis and Long (2001), Chernew and Leibowitz (1992), Royalty (2000), Finkelstein (2002), Gruber and Lettau (2004)).…”

Section: Relationship To Other Estimatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of state tax subsidies for private long-term care insurance on coverage and Medicaid expenditures

Goda

2011

Journal of Public Economics

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In spite of the large expected costs of needing long-term care, only 10-12 percent of the elderly population has private insurance coverage. Medicaid, which provides means-tested public assistance and pays for almost half of long-term care costs, spends more than $100 billion annually on long-term care. In this paper, I exploit variation in the adoption and generosity of state tax subsidies for private long-term care insurance to determine whether tax subsidies increase private coverage and reduce Medicaid's costs for long-term care. The results indicate that the average tax subsidy raises coverage rates by 2.7 percentage points, or 28 percent. However, the response is concentrated among high income and asset-rich individuals, populations with low probabilities of relying on Medicaid. Simulations suggest each dollar of state tax expenditure produces approximately $0.84 in Medicaid savings, over half of which funnels to the federal government.JEL Codes: G22, H31, H51, H71, H75, I11, I18, I38, J14

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“…A study by Marquis and Long (1995) suggests that a credit of 100% (or nearly 100%) is necessary to achieve a high participation rate.…”

Section: An Alternative Credit Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If this is considered a serious problem, however, a better-targeted solution would be to impose actuarial value requirements on all policies as a condition of credit eligibility. 33 In particular, Marquis and Long (1995) predict a low participation rate for a credit for 60% of the cost of health insurance. 34 It is not crucial to the proposal how often the government pays the insurer.…”

Section: Successmentioning

confidence: 99%