Words, Species, and Kinds

Miller, J. T. M.

doi:10.5334/met.70

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…This conclusion receives support below when the difficulty of providing a theory of word individuation is discussed. Miller ( 2021 ) has gone further, arguing that essentialism for words must be wrong because it is part of the nature of words that they may change over time. In place of an essentialist model of words, Miller has argued that words are homeostatic property clusters.…”

Section: The Argument From Illusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…So if the problem of individuation leads to word eliminativism then it also leads to eliminativism about a range of social and biological entities too. As noted, Miller ( 2021 ) argues that words are homeostatic property clusters, a view which aims to secure realism about words while explaining their resistance to classical definition.…”

Section: The Argument From Individuationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The case for eliminativism about words

Tasker

2022

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Words are ubiquitous and familiar, and the concept of a word features both in common-sense ways of understanding the world, and in more theoretical discourse. Nonetheless, it has been repeatedly argued that there is no such thing as words. In this paper, I will set out a range of arguments for eliminativism about words, and indicate the most promising responses. I begin by considering an eliminativist argument based on the alleged mind-dependency of words, before turning to two challenges arising from linguistic theory in the Chomskian tradition. The first of these is issued by Rey in a number of places, including in his recent book (Rey, 2020). The second is Collins’s ( 2010, 2021a) argument based on the alleged explanatory redundancy of words. I will also consider an eliminativist challenge based on the difficulty of providing existence and persistence conditions for words. One general lesson which emerges is that these eliminativist arguments, if they work at all, could be turned against a whole swathe of non-linguistic objects; in other words, the case for eliminativism about words is no stronger than the case for eliminativism about ordinary objects in general.

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Section: The Argument From Illusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Argument From Individuationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The case for eliminativism about words

Tasker

2022

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Unspeakable names

Michaelson

2023

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There are some names which cannot be spoken and others which cannot be written, at least on certain very natural ways of conceiving of them. Interestingly, this observation proves to be in tension with a wide range of views about what names are. Prima facie, this looks like a problem for predicativists. Ultima facie, it turns out to be equally problematic for Millians. For either sort of theorist, resolving this tension requires embracing a revisionary account of the metaphysics of names. Revisionary Millianism, I argue, offers some important advantages over its predicativist competitor.

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Katz got your tongue? The metaphysics of words

Begley

2023

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Words, Species, and Kinds

Cited by 6 publications

References 23 publications

The case for eliminativism about words

The case for eliminativism about words

Unspeakable names

Katz got your tongue? The metaphysics of words

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