‘Words are cheaper than bullets’: Britain’s psychological warfare in the Middle East, 1945–60

Abstract

Psychological warfare, the use of propaganda to aid military operations, acquired prominence in British strategy in the early Cold War Middle East. This article argues planning made limited progress until the 1956 Suez crisis. Suez produced optimism about propaganda's ability to address threats from Egypt, the USSR and the Yemen. In Oman, Aden and Cyprus, psychological warfare was practiced to demoralise enemies, bolster allies and counter smears about British conduct. Only mixed results ensued though, and doubts about the military's involvement in propaganda lingered. Psychological warfare endured because it was a cheap option that might sometimes work, and could induce opponents to surrender rather than fight on.

States vs. Social Movements: Protests and State Repression in Asia

“…In addition to confirming the use of different tactics for state repression (Boudreau, 2004;Gupta et al, 1993), this study also suggests that states strategically coordinate their tactics. As propaganda is cheaper to utilize than military or police violence (Bennett, 2019), weak states that seek to control their citizenry may be incentivized to use propaganda first for cost reasons. However, given the persistence of the protests, it appears that states still often resort to violence as it often guarantees the dispersal of protesters (whether by arrests, pain, or death).…”

“…While there is little research that empirically studies whether a government is more likely to use propaganda or violence, propaganda production is relatively lower in cost compared to troops (Bennett, 2019). This is especially true with the internet, as governments can hire or outsource the production of digital propaganda on websites and social media platforms (Horz, 2021).…”

Hired guns against terrorism: assessing the use of commercial soldiers in Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy

“…The use of psychological warfare, also known as "psywar" or "PSYOP," is not a new concept and was not developed in Nigeria, but it is recognized as an effective counterinsurgency tool and has been identified as an important component in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria. The aim is to sway the beliefs, attitudes, and actions of a target group or adversary, leading to a reduction in their will to fight while simultaneously gaining support from the [target] population (Crossman, 1952;Sun Tsu, 2013;Bennett, 2019). In this case, the Nigerian Army and the local population were the targets.…”